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FISHING EXPEDITIONS ALLOWED: THE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
1938 FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULESt
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN*
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system of
concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of litigation
followed by surprise and confusion at the trial. . . . All this is well
recognized by the profession, and yet there is a wide-spread fear of
liberalizing discovery. Hostility to "fishing expeditions" before trial
is a traditional and powerful taboo.
—Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.,
DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL at iii (1932).
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing
expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the rele-
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation
. . . .
—Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (Murphy, J.).
Prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules"),
discovery in civil cases in federal court was severely limited. 1 The
Federal Rules discovery provisions dramatically increased the potential
for discovery. 2 Authorized by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 ("Rules
Enabling Act" or "Enabling Act"),3 the Federal Rules became law in
1938.4 The Rules Enabling Act was preceded by a twenty-three year
battle, spearheaded primarily by a committee of the American Bar
t Copyright c 1998 by Stephen N. Subrin.
* Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. A.B., 1958, Harvard University; L.L.B.,
1963, Harvard University. I am grateful for the patience, hard work and skill of my students,
Rachel Dimitruk and Amber Klingc. My deep thanks go out once again to my colleague, editor
and friend, Judy Brown, who adds clarity by ruthless excision. Many of us will be lost if quasi-re-
tirement dulls her pencil or eraser.
I See infra text accompanying notes 22-39.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 159-218.
3 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. Civ. P.") became law by congressional
inaction on September 16, 1938. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF 'FITE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 37-38 (2d ed. 1947).
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Association ("ABA")..6 During the Enabling Act debate, discovery was
largely ignored. 6 The Hickman v. Taylor quotation demonstrates how
far attitudes about discovery had changed between 1932 and 1946.
This paper addresses the questions of how and why the change oc-
curred, what reservations the Federal Rules drafters and others had
about the new discovery provisions and what future procedural reform-
ers can learn from this earlier experience.
1. THE ABSENCE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENABLING ACT DEBATE
In 1911, Thomas W. Shelton of Virginia introduced a resolution
at an ABA meeting for the creation of an ABA Committee on Uniform
Judicial Procedure' in support of legislation that would empower the
United States Supreme Court to promulgate uniform procedural rules
for civil cases in law. The ABA resolution was vigorously opposed for
over two decades, especially by Senator Thomas Walsh, a Democratic
progressive from Montana!' What is perhaps most surprising in the
public debate among those who most vigorously fought for and against
the Enabling Act is the insignificance of discovery issues.
The proponents of the Enabling Act usually led off with an attack
on the Conformity Act of 1872, which required (excepting equity and
admiralty cases) that the civil procedure in each federal trial court
conform "as near as may be" with that of the state in which the court
sat. 9 They argued that many federal procedural statutes and practices
justifiably took precedence over conformity to state law, 1 ° and that as
a result it was extremely difficult to ascertain what procedure would
apply in any given federal trial court." According to the proponents,
this difficulty cost time and money, needlessly caused appeals, and
5 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1939, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1048-98 (1982).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 7-38. Nonetheless, discussion concerning discovery
emerged during the congressional sub-committee hearings in 1938 in which the rules themselves
were discussed. See infra text accompanying notes 235-38.
7 36 REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 50 (1911). With
regard to equity rules, however, the Supreme Court had authority to promulgate rules for equity
cases beginning in 1792. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT., LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 61, at 426 (5th
ed. 1994) (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276).
8 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1048-98; see also Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in
the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 479-85 (1963) (providing the story for this
battle).
9 Act of junc 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
1 ° See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989).
11 See Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure—Let Congress Set the Supreme Court
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forced clients, particularly interstate corporations, to retain specialized
lawyers in each state.I 2
The proponents suggested that when the Supreme Court was
empowered to make procedural rules for all federal trial courts, the
states would adopt voluntarily this model for their own procedure;' 3
hence there would be both national federal and intra-state uniformity.
According to Shelton and other proponents, federal judges justifiably
did not conform procedure to that of the states in which they sat,
because frequently state procedures were flawed." For years there had
been complaints that both common law procedure and code proce-
dure (patterned on the 1848 New York Field Code ("Field Code"))
were too technical and interfered with cases being decided on the
merits. 15 The proponents especially railed against the thousands of
amendments to the Field Code that they blamed on the politics and
inexpertise of the New York state legislature. They claimed that the
hands of judges were tied by rigid procedures and urged simple,
flexible rules that would give the judges discretion to do justice in the
individual case. None of these arguments mentioned the need to re-
form discovery's' nor did the major opponent to the uniform federal
rule movement, Senator Walsh, talk about discovery in his many
speeches and writings against the Enabling Act)?
Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 320-21 (1911); see also Thomas Wall Shelton, Let Congress Set the Supreme
Court Free, 75 CENT. L.J. 126, 126-27 (1912). Shelton's 1911 ABA resolution began: "Whereas,
Section 914 of the Revised Statutes [the Conformity Act of 18721 has utterly failed to bring about
a general uniformity in federal and state proceedings in civil cases . . ." 37 REPORT OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 434 (1912).
12 See Subrin, supra note 10, at 2002-03.
15 See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509, 515-16 (1920).
HAS part of this argument in favor of the Enabling Act, a 1917 Senate Report started with
criticism of the Conformity Act and ended by stating that the "Supreme Court will adopt rules
of so simple and workable a character that they will constitute models for the various states ...."
S. ker. No 892, at 2, 6 (1917). The expertise and prestige of the United States Supreme Court
was needed to promulgate modern, correlated, simple, flexible, uniform rules. See &thrill, supra
note 10, at 2002-06; see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 956-61 (1987) (providing
more complete descriptions of this argument).
16 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF TIME LAW OF CODE PLEADING 31, 34-35 (1928).
16 They also (lid not mention other specific aspects of procedure. They did, however, speak
positively about equity procedure. Perhaps one could consider their general talk of the advantages
of equity procedure as implying liberal pleading standards, broader joinder of parties and issues,
and enlarged discovery. See Subrin, supra note 14, at 956-61.
"Senator Thomas Walsh argued that equity procedure was by no means as simple and
ascertainable as the proponents contended. See, e.g., Simplification of JudicialProcedure: Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. 522 Before the Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. 12
(1915) (statements of Thomas Walsh). See also Thomas j. Walsh, Reform of Federal Procedure,
Address Delivered at a Meeting of the Tri-State Bar Association at Texarkana, Ark-Tex, (Apr. 23,
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Walsh, selected by Franklin Delano Roosevelt to be his first Attor-
ney General, died on his way to FDR's inauguration. This paved the
way for Homer Cummings to become Attorney General, and it was
Cummings who later convinced FDR to support the Enabling Act and
who steered it through Congress.'s Ironically, what had been a reform
sponsored largely by conservatives, such as William Howard Taft and
the ABA, and opposed by progressives and populists, such as Senator
Walsh and the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee who
followed his lead, was ultimately passed as New Deal legislation.i°
There are many reasons why discovery was not part of the debate
over the Enabling Act. Most of the discussion related to overriding
questions of politics, power and the needs of the profession. 20 The
major proponents of the Enabling Act were largely politicians and
propagandists, not procedural scholars. It is unlikely that they had a
clear view of the exact procedures that would result from their efforts,
although there were many hints that they were leaning to a procedure
largely based on equity. 2 ' Moreover, specificity at this early stage may
well have provoked the opposition of those lawyers and judges who
had mastered the procedures of their home states.
II. ANTI-DISCOVERY SENTIMENT AND THE LIMITED ROLE OF
DISCOVERY PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Historically, discovery had been extremely limited in both Eng-
land and the United States. At early common law, the litigation process
1926), in S. Doc. No. 69-105, at 1-2 (1926). The major strands of the Walsh opposition argued
that the Conformity Act worked better than the proponents painted; that it was usually quite easy
to know what procedure applied in any given federal court; that while uniform federal rules
would make it easier for the relatively few lawyers who practiced extensively in federal court, it
would be much harder for the run-of-the-mill lawyer who was very familiar with state procedure
but would only occasionally practice in federal court; that the Field Code worked very well in
Walsh's state of Montana and in other states, and that any new procedure would be more
complicated and subject to years of interpretation and confusion; that unlike England, the United
States was too large and had too many regions fur one national procedure; that the legislature
in a democracy was a more appropriate body for drafting procedural rules; that the Enabling Act
might be an unconstitutional delegation from the legislature to the courts; and that the Supreme
Court members, whom Walsh labeled conservative, recluses and distant from the work of trial
courts, were a particularly ill-suited group to do the tedious and practical work of drafting
procedural rules. See Subrin, supra note 10, at 2007-09; see also Subrin, supra note 14, at 996-98
(providing a longer summary of the Walsh position).
12 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1095-98; see also Chandler, supra note 8, at 483-85.
19 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 969.
20 There was also debate, as Professor Stephen Burbank urged 15 years ago, concerning the
substantive rules beyond the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, not as a question of
federalism but as a crucial separation of powers issue. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1106-07.
21 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 956-73.
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was looked at not as a rational quest for truth, but rather a method by
which society could determine which side God took to be truthful or
just. 22 Discovery did not make sense in a world of ordeal, battle and
oath-takers. Initially, the jurors themselves were people in the commu-
nity who had knowledge of the facts." Nor was there much need for
discovery at the later period of the common law when the pleadings
assumed such a critical role. The major purpose of single issue plead-
ing was to reduce the case to a demurred issue that could be decided
legally or to a limited question of fact. 2"
There were other reasons why discovery was so limited. The Eng-
lish barristers were centered in London. Travel was difficult. It would
not have been easy for them to have participated in discovery in the
counties where the assizes were held. 25 In addition, in both England
and the United States, after the Puritan sense of community dwindled,
there was a deep belief in the independence and self-sufficiency of
each citizen. Indeed, the adversary system exemplified the "each per-
son for himself' mentality. The idea that one should help opponents
prepare their case was distasteful. 26 There was a long-standing and
widely-held belief that if either side could discover the factual position
of the opponent, the discovering side would perjure testimony. 27 Per-
haps most importantly, at common law a party could neither take the
stand nor force the opposing party to do so. 28 Because the most natural
person to discover would be the opposing party, and because his or
her testimony was inadmissible in law cases, discovery made little
sense."
22 See id. at 916.
23
 It was only later that jurors were to be ignorant of the facts in dispute prior to hearing
testimony. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. CEO/TREY C. HAZARD, JR.., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (3d ed.
1985). 24 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 916.
25 See generally WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTII, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956);
THEODORE, F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CO2.12.10N LAW (5th ed. 1956).
26 The continuation of the depth of this resistance can be seen in the almost universal
attorney opposition to mandatory discovery under FED R. Ctv. P. 26(a) (amended 1993). See, e.g.,
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 Ga. L. REV. 1,
28-30 (1992); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and 1411iy of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REV.
9, 19-21 (1994).
27 See Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE U. 863,
866-67 (1933) (citing joitig Wictuot, WIGRAM ON DISCOVERY § 347 (1842)).
2s See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 207 (1952).
25 See id. Millar asserted that it was the party's disqualification that "lent to the chancery
procedure of discovery its commanding importance." Id. Moreover, unlike the law courts, which
did not assume that they had power over non-parties except fur the limited purpose of compelling
discovery at trial, equity courts did have direct power over the defendant's body. That is one
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The biggest systemic procedural change in the United States, after
the adoption of common law systems, was the Field Code. Copied in
twenty-seven states," the Field Code engaged in some liberalization of
discovery. 3 I The Field Code permitted depositions of the opposing
party: "In contrast to the Federal Rules [,however], the Code deposi-
tion was in lieu of calling the adverse party at the trial, and subject to
`the same rules of examination' as at trial. A pretrial deposition . .
was to be before a judge, who would rule on evidence objections." 32
David Dudley Field distrusted authority of any kind, particularly
the unelected judiciary. He despised equity, particularly its discretion-
ary aspects, and its implicit power over the individual. As I have written
elsewhere, "Field wanted to reduce the amount of documentation.
Making equity trials likelaw trials, with testimony in open court, was a
critical step in achieving the merger of law and equity. The Field Code
eliminated equitable bills of discovery, and interrogatories as part of
the equitable bill . . . . There were no interrogatory provisions in the
Field Code.""
Unlike the drafters of the Federal Rules, Field believed that pre-
cise and verified pleadings should be used to eliminate legal and
factual issues and to focus the controversy. 34 Field was a true nineteenth
century liberal, in the sense that his greatest political goal was that each
individual should be left alone and that government intervention
should be kept at a minimum:" "It is not the business of government
to take care of the people. The people must and will take care of
themselves. This is the law of nature, which is the law of God." 36 It is
difficult to know whether Field would have been more appalled by
reason why precursors to modern discovery—written interrogatories and depositions of parties—
had their birth in equity. See JAstEs & Heamto, supra note 23, at 223-24.
" See CHARLES M. HEPI3URN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA
AND ENGLAND 14-15, 88-89 (1897).
31 See GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 17-18, 334 (1932).
"Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier
Procedural Vision, 6 Law & HIST. REv. 311, 333 (1988) (citations omitted). The Field Code had
restrictive provisions concerning the inspection and copying of papers in the possession or
control of the opposition, but the only penalty for nun-compliance was that the court could, if it
wanted, on motion, "exclude the paper from being given in evidence." Id.
35 Id. at 332.
34 See id. at 3'28-31; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK STATE) PRACTICE CocatssIoN,
reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 290,
302-03 (A.P. Sprague ed. 1884).
55 See Subrin, supra note 32, 319-15, 323-27.
"David Dudley Field, Municipal Officers, Address to the Young Men's Democratic Club of
New York (Mar. 13, 1879), in 2 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD 177, 183 (A.P. Sprague ed. 1884).
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expansive discovery that invaded the privacy of citizens or by the
expansive role of the judiciary in overseeing and managing litigation.
Field's libertarian views explain the pejorative power of the term
"fishing expedition": 37 to permit fishing in an opponent's mind or files,
under the auspices of the judiciary, was an outrage to those who
opposed expanded discovery. In 1932, in his influential study of dis-
covery practices, George Ragland explained that "[t]he epithet 'fishing
excursion for the adverse party's evidence' has been employed against
the taking of depositions for discovery in every state where it has been
attempted, first for the purpose of preventing the examination entirely,
and failing of this, for the purpose of restricting its scope."" In his
foreword to Ragland's hook, Discovery Before Trial, Edson Sunderland
stated that proponents of expanded discovery would have to overcome
the "fishing expedition" argument and image:
It is probable that no procedural process offers greater op-
portunities for increasing the efficiency of the administration
of justice than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay
in the preparation of a case, most of the lost effort in the
course of the trial, and a large part of the uncertainty in the
outcome, result from the want of information on the part of
litigants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respec-
tive claims and the facts upon which they rest.
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a sys-
tem of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of
litigation followed by surprise and confusion at the trial. Un-
der such a system the merits of controversies are imperfectly
understood by the parties, are inadequately presented to the
courts, and too often fail to exert a controlling influence
upon the final judgment.
All this is well recognized by the profession, and yet there
is a wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to
"fishing expeditions" before trial is a traditional and powerful
taboo. To overcome its subtle influence requires more than
logic and learning. Experience alone can effectively meet it."
37 See, e.g., RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 36, 305 (reversing an earlier ruling, a Kansas court
in the late nineteenth century forbade the use of deposition procedure for what it termed "fishing
expeditions") (citations omitted).
38 Id, at 120.
39 Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL at iii
(1932).
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III. DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL
RULES
In 1935, Edson Sunderland started drafting what became Rules 26
to 37 of the Federal Rules." Up to that time, extremely limited discov-
ery took place in both law and equity cases in the federal courts. For
law cases, the sole discovery (except the motion for a bill of particulars,
which was considered a pleading device, and an equitable bill for
discovery in support of a law case, a cumbersome and infrequently
used device)'" was provided for in two federal statutes dealing with
depositions. 42 The two statutes also applied to equity cases. 45 The first
statute, which was contained in 28 U.S.C. § 639, dealt with depositions
de bene esse, or conditional depositions. It permitted depositions only
in the following circumstances: "when the witness lived more than one
hundred miles from the place of trial, or was on a voyage at sea, or
about to go out of the United States, or when the witness was aged or
infirm."'" The second statute, then called 28 U.S.C. § 644, covered
depositions under a dedimus potestatem, 45 which historically had been a
writ or commission out of chancery empowering one to do a specific
act, such as administering an oath to a defendant and recording
defendant's answers to questions." Section 644 required that such a
deposition could be taken only in cases where it was "necessary to
prevent a failure or delay of justice." 47
To warrant the taking of such a deposition it was necessary
to show 1) that the issue had been joined in a pending action,
4° See Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 Mimi.
L. Rev. 6, 7, 10 (1959). Sunderland's initial draft covered what came to be adopted as Rules
26-35. See id. at 10.
41 See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET	 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 App.100 (3d ed. 1997).
One could use an equitable bill of discovery in aid of a legal action, but "there was a conflict of
opinion as to whether a party could obtain discovery only of evidence that was relevant to the
claim or defense or whether the party could obtain discovery of evidence which was relevant to
any issue in dispute." Id. Moreover, "[t]he bill of discovery was a cumbersome proceeding. The
courts were constantly burdened, with applications to settle the form, scope, and propriety of
interrogatories." Id. (citing a Learned Hand opinion (Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 241 F. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)) (stating that "Judge Learned Hand pointed out the
wastefulness of this procedure") ).
42 See Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 19 (1938); see also 6
Mocat, supra note 41, § 26 App.100.
43 See Sunderland, supra note 42, at 19.
44 Id,
45 See id.
46 See BLACK'S Law DICTIONARY 413 (6th ed. 1990).
47 Sunderland, supra note 42, at 19.
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2) that a dedimus was necessary to prevent a failure or delay
of justice, 3) that the witness was beyond the reach of the
court's process, 4) that the testimony could not be taken de
bene esse pursuant to notice, and 5) that the application was
made in good faith and not merely for discovery purposes. 48
The granting of a dedimus potestatem was discretionary and reversible
only for clear abuse. 49
Both of these statutes seemed designed to obtain testimony for
trial under circumstances when a witness was likely to be absent, or
when critical evidence was needed for trial or to complete a pleading
otherwise unobtainable, rather than to serve as pretrial discovery de-
vices designed to ferret out information or to lock in a particular
version of the facts. One could use a subpoena duces tecum when taking
a deposition in an attempt to inspect documents, but this would work
only in the same limited circumstances that a deposition could be
taken. 5°
There were two additional rules for equity cases. 51 First, Federal
Equity Rule 47, promulgated in 1912, stated that "[Otte court, upon
application of either party, when allowed by statute, or for good and
exceptional cause for departing from the general rule, to be shown by
affidavit, may permit the deposition of named witnesses . . . ." 52 The
language "departing from the general rule" is a reference to Federal
Equity Rule 46 that "kJ n all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise provided by
statute or these rules."" Despite the limitations in Rule 47, some courts
evidently were willing to "in effect treat most equity cases as 'excep-
tional' if the counsel for the litigants agree to such procedure." 54
4" 6 MoouE, supra note 41, § 26 App.100 (citations omitted).
4" See id. § 26 App.100 n.11 (citations omitted).
511 See Sunderland, supra note 42, at 20.
IL See id.
52 FED. Eq. R. 47 (1912), in GEORGE Fa.ntiucit Rustt, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 221
(1913).
53 FED. Eq. R. 46, in Rust', supra note 52, at 220-21. Under the Federal Equity Rules of 1842,
equity cases in federal court had previously been decided on the basis of documents and written
testimony, See Robert H. Talley, The New and Old Federal Equity Rules Compared, 18 VA. L. REG.
663,667 (1913).
54 Wallace R. Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 HARV. L. REV. 276,291 (1921-1922). According
to Lane, "Din some districts the courts strictly enforce the rule that testimony of all witnesses
within the reach of subpoenas be given in open court, as the judges indicate that they prefer to
hear and see the witnesses on the stand .. , ." Id. at 291-92. Lane's footnote 66 states that "Judge
Rose (Maryland), in order to hear witnesses orally, occasionally sits in advance of the trial to take
the evidence of some witness who may not be available at the time of trial." Id. at 292 n.66.
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Sunderland believed that Rule 47, like the two deposition statutes
referred to earlier, could not be viewed rightly as a discovery device.
"The purpose here was not discovery but obtaining proof."55
To Sunderland, the second rule—Federal Equity Rule 58, which
set forth three types of discovery in equity cases—was "the only provi-
sion in the entire federal system intended for discovery." 56 First, Rule
58 allowed a party to file interrogatories to opposing parties for the
discovery of "facts and documents material to the support or defense
of the cause . . . "57 Second, a party, by motion allowed followed by a
judicial order, was permitted "to effect the inspection or production
of documents in the possession of either party and containing evidence
material to the cause of action or defense of his adversary. "58 Both of
these provisions were limited by judicial interpretation to ascertaining
facts or documents relating to the seeking party's own case but not the
case of the adversary. According to Sunderland, these two types of
discovery were "good for attack but not for defense. It is nothing, in
fact, but the discovery available under the old chancery bill of discov-
ery. The discovery most needed is denied, that least needed is permit-
ted."59
Last, Rule 58 permitted a party to seek a written admission from
the opponent in advance of trial of "the execution or genuineness of
any document, letter or other writing .. .."5° Such requests for admis-
sions only went to writings, as opposed to facts generally. 5' Moreover,
one would have to know in advance about the writing to seek the
admission, and, as we have seen, there was only limited discovery as to
this.62
Some evidence suggests that the Supreme Court did not take
advantage of opportunities to expand discovery in federal courts when
it might have done so legitimately. For example, the Judiciary Act of
1789 provided that:
53
 Sunderland, supra note 42, at 20.
56 Id.
57 Fan. Eq. R. 58, in Rusts, supra note 52, at 224.
58 Id., in RUSH, supra note 52, at 225.
59 Sunderland, supra note 42, at 21. Also, according to Equity Rule 58, "the party seeking an
inspection of documents was required to obtain an admission from the adverse party that the
documents were in his possession, custody, or control before the court would make an order for
their production." 7 MookE, supra note 41, § 34 App.10012].
60 Fan. Eq. R. 58, in Rusts, supra note 52, at 225.
61 See Sunderland, supra note 42, at 21.
62
 See id.
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In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United States
may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties
to produce books or writings in their possession or power
which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and
under circumstances where they might be compelled to pro-
duce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chan-
cery."
The trial courts disagreed as to whether this statute permitted in-
spection of documents prior to trial, or only at trial. Moore's Federal
Practice lists four federal district court cases, including one affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, hold-
ing that "the court had the power to order the production of books
and papers before trial as well as at the trial."" But in 1911, the
Supreme Court held otherwise, deciding that the statute covered
only production at trial."
As we will soon explore, many states had broader discovery provi-
sions than the federal system. There was the potential for the Conform-
ity Act of 1872 to permit, if not require, federal courts to apply the
more liberal state discovery provisions.G 6 In 1885, the Supreme Court
held that a New York statute that permitted the deposition of a party
under circumstances broader than those permitted under the federal
statutes should not apply in federal court. 67 Many federal courts held
that the 1789 federal statute that permitted parties to force their
opponents to produce books and writings at trial, and that did not
apply to pretrial production, nonetheless "preempt[ed] the field so as
to exclude the application in the federal courts of state laws that
permitted the inspection of documents before trial."6B According to
Sunderland, "[t]here was no recourse to state statutes for discovery
under the conformity act, because it was held that the federal statutes
provided a complete system of deposition procedure, and the conform-
ity act was therefore not applicable."G 9
63 7 MOORE, supra note 41, § 34 App.100[11. This was last codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1946).
According to Moore, this "was superseded by the Rules [Fan. R. Cw. P.1 and was formally repealed
by the judicial Code of 1948." Id.
64 7 Mooka, supra note 41, § 34 App.1001 11 & 11.1.
65 See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 593-96 (1911).
''Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 1%, 197.
57 See Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720-25 (1885).
68 7 MOORE, supra note 41, § 34 App.100 [11.
°Sunderland, supra now 42, at 20.
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IV. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR. AND STATE DISCOVERY
EXPERIMENTATION: A PRO-DISCOVERY OUTLOOK WITH HINTS OF
DISCOVERY ABUSE
In 1932, three years before Sunderland started drafting the dis-
covery rules, George Ragland, Jr. published his influential book Dis-
covery Before TriaL 70
 Ragland had been a Graduate Fellow and Research
Associate at the University of Michigan, where Sunderland taught. 7 '
According to Sunderland, Ragland's "researcheS included practically
everything to be found in print on the subject." 72 Ragland also com-
piled in an appendix the "statutory provisions on discovery" of every
state, as well as the federal provisions and those of England, Ontario
and Quebec." The book ends with two important chapters. The first
provides drafts for statutory provisions that would permit, as a matter
of right, oral depositions of all parties and witnesses, and that would
permit a party to require the opposition to disclose under oath "all the
documents which are or have been in his possession or power, relating
to any matters in question in the action." 7' The final chapter, entitled
the "Contribution of Discovery to the General Administration of Jus-
tice," enthusiastically supports the expanded use of discovery. Charles
Clark wrote a laudatory review of the book," and the book was fre-
quently cited by Clark, Sunderland and others as supportive of ex-
panded discovery."
Ragland's book provides an excellent window for viewing how far
experimentation on expanded discovery had gone in the country and,
perhaps more surprisingly, how little of the country had been in-
fluenced up to that time. It also reveals warning signals about discovery
that Ragland significantly underplayed in his conclusions. The judicial
75 RAGLAND, supra note 31, at title page.
71
 See id. at iii-iv.
72
 See id. at iv (Foreword by Edson R. Sunderland). Ragland also conducted field studies in
14 jurisdictions (12 states and Ontario and Quebec) "for the purpose of ascertaining the experi-
ence of the profession with each type of device which is being used . . . ." Id. at v (Preface by
Ragland). He interviewed judges, lawyers and court officials ("hundreds" of them, according to
Sunderland). See id. at iv, v. Sunderland described the book as representing "an extensive survey
of the current practice regarding this important procedural device, in the light of its history and
its logical theory." Id. at iv.
73 See id. at 267; see generally id. at 267-391.
74 Id. at 248. Ragland added: "Production for inspection of documents which arc thus
disclosed may be required from the party who has possession or control of them by notice to
produce." Id. at 249.
75 See generally Charles E. Clark, Book Reviews, 42 YALE L.J. 988 (1933) (reviewing GEORGE
RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932)).
75 See, e.g., infra note 136.
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Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Committee" or
"Advisory Committee") drafters, especially in their public pronounce-
ments, also tended to disregard or underplay those signals.
Probably the most important change made by the Federal Rules
with respect to federal discovery was to permit parties to take oral
depositions of both parties and witnesses as a matter of right; moreover,
such depositions would not be taken in the presence of a judicial
officer ruling on objections or deciding at the time on the scope of
the questioning. In his book, Ragland pointed to only seven states in
which oral discovery was generally permitted from witnesses as well as
parties: Ohio, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Missouri, Nebraska, Indiana
and Texas." In four of those skates (including New Hampshire and
Missouri, where depositions were most widespread), the deposition was
before an "officer who is empowered to compel answers and to decide
objections.' Moreover, in Missouri cities of greater than 50,000 in-
habitants, a party served with a notice of his or her deposition could
"apply to the court for the appointment of a special commissioner to
supervise the examination?" In Indiana, Kentucky and Texas, "if ob-
jections arise which cannot be decided among counsel, the examina-
tion is adjourned until a ruling can be obtained from the trial court.'")
Piecing together the evidence in different parts of Ragland's book
shows that in each of the seven states there was either an officer at the
deposition who could rule on objections or the ability to adjourn the
deposition when there was a dispute in order to go to a judge. Ragland
wrote that:
Access to the judge, especially in larger cities, often is difficult
. . . . In some of the smaller towns in Indiana, Kentucky and
elsewhere, local lawyers sometimes' take advantage of lawyers
from the city who have come to conduct an examination for
discovery. Knowing that their opponents are anxious to finish
"See RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 51. Ragland noted that oral discovery was also permitted
in a few other states where it had not been used to any considerable extent." Id. at 50 (emphasis
added). He also found that the taking of depositions of witnesses for purposes of discovery was
more widespread in New Hampshire and Missouri than anywhere else. See id. at 51. He provided
several reasons why the taking of depositions of witnesses is so rare even in those relatively few
slates where they were allowed: lawyers can usually "get voluntary statements from witnesses," id;
fear of "supplying ammunition for his adversary," id. at 52; fear of being bound by witness
deposition testimony (although Ragland cites Wigmore to show that this is an unjustified fear),
see id. at 52-53; and the "expense involved" in taking depositions, id. at 53.
18 Id. at 104.
79 Id. at 107-08.
80 Id. at 97.
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the examination and return to the city and are not apt to wait
over until a rather tardy judge compels an answer, they in-
struct their clients to refuse to answer questions which clearly
are proper. 8 '
In addition, many states provided that adverse or opposite parties
could be examined or interrogated for discovery." New York allowed
for depositions of one's own party or "any other party."" According to
Ragland, "New York has the most elaborate statutory provisions for
discovery before trial which exist in any of the various states, yet the
actual practice thereunder is very illiberal and unsatisfactory. "84 One
sees in New York in the pre-Federal Rules period both how restrictive
some state courts were with respect to the limited discovery allowed in
the state and how adversarial lawyers could be in preventing disclosure
and in pushing the outer limits of permissible discovery.
Originally one could depose a party in New York only upon court
order." This was changed to depositions on notice, but with the right
to move to vacate or modify the notice." But then New York lawyers
began filing motions to vacate or modify "in nearly every important
case, where a notice is given, and with the practice growing of applying
to the court, in the first instance . . . ."" The notice had to include,
among other things, "[t] he matters upon which such person or per-
sons are to be examined."88
 According to Ragland, "[t] he requirement
that the subject matter of the examination be stated has caused more
difficulty than any other."89
 The courts held that one could not add
additional matters by subsequent notices so long as the first notice was
(11 Id. at 100-01.
82 See RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 37.
" Id. at 37 (citing New York Civil Practice Act § 288 and Kirtnan v. Fries, 220 N.Y.S. 430
(1927)). Ragland wrote about New York's discovery practices in great detail, which was very
helpful because this was the most populated state; the Chairman of the Advisory Committee,
William Mitchell, practiced law there and many of the committee had New York connections;
and New York lawyers were mentioned as particularly contentious in later discussions about
discovery. See, e.g., William D. Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee
in Recent Months—Commencement of Actions—Effect of Findings of Fact in Cases Tried by Court
Instead ofjury, Etc., 23 A.B.A. J. 966, 969 (1937). Of all the states, Ragland's Index referenced
New York and Wisconsin the most See RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 900, 406.
54 1d. at 337.
86 See id. at 67.
86
 See id.
" RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 68 (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 69 (citing New York - Civil Practice Act § 290; Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 121).
89 1d. at 70. There was disagreement among the departments as to the degree of specificity
required, and the Act was amended in 1923 to substitute the word "matters" for the word "issues."
See id.
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outstanding, and that a party could not serve successive notices or
applications for orders while others were outstanding."
Moreover, one department of the Appellate Division limited dis-
covery in automobile negligence cases to ownership and control of the
vehicle, denying discovery with respect to the facts of liability and
damages. 9 ' Ragland reported similar restrictions in such tort actions as
deceit, libel and malpractice.92 In New York, a party could have discov-
ery "only as to the issues of which he has the affirmative [defense]
under the pleadings."9g According to Ragland, "[s] ince the defendant
can have no discovery except on his affirmative defenses, he often puts
in fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of securing an examination
of his adversary. Indeed several New York lawyers pointed to this as one
of the chief defects in the present system."94
In addition to expanding oral depositions to all witnesses, the
Federal Rules permitted a party to inspect property of another party
and to inspect and copy other parties' documents. The original rule
required the discoverer to move for an order "showing good cause
therefor" and limited the right to inspect and copy documents to
"evidence material to any matter involved in the action."95 Once again,
Ragland used state rules to show limitations on this type of discovery:
"Insufficient remedy is afforded the party who is unable to specify
particular documents in the possession of his adversary and yet desires
to ascertain what documents are in his possession." 96 Recall that Mis-
souri and New Hampshire were the states with the most widespread
use of oral depositions. In Missouri, a party could not be forced to
produce books and papers for inspection if a deposition was before
either a notary or commissioner. 97 In New Hampshire, the lawyers
disagreed whether a party deponent had to bring documents with
him." There was a similar disagreement in New York." Ragland listed
90 See id.
pi See id. at 30,127-28.
92 RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 30; see also id. at 129 (and the citations therein).
95 Id. at 32; see also id. at 102.
94 1d. at 132.
95 FED. R. Qv. P. 34,308 U.S. 645 (1938). Subsequent amendments both eliminated the need
to obtain a court order and broadened the scope of what could be sought.
96 RAGLAND, supra note 91, at 179. If a party could ascertain what documents he wanted to
inspect, Ragland noted that a party could conduct limited discovery, depending on the jurisdic-
tion, either in conjunction with a deposition or by a separate statutory provision for the inspection
of documents. See id. at 183.
97 See id. at 184-85.
98 See id. at 185.
99 See id. at 185-86.
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twenty-nine states in which one could apply for an order that a party
give inspection and permit copying of documents.'" In six other states,
one was required to make a demand on the adverse party and, upon
refusal, could move for an order.'°' Seven other states required a
petition or application in writing. 102
Ragland reported several state statutes that provided for inspec-
tion of property but that "are rather limited in scope."'" As for notices
to admit facts, the only jurisdictions Ragland cited were England,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey and Wisconsin. 104 The
courts in these states were in disagreement as to what types of facts
were the proper subject for a request. A New York court "criticized the
practice of covering the whole field of evidence under notices to
admit," and thought that a notice with 226 separately numbered para-
graphs was excessive.'" Ragland observed that:
Some Wisconsin lawyers are using the device in exactly the
same fashion which the New York court has criticized. They
call upon their opponents to admit practically every item of
evidence. Several cases were found in which as many as one
hundred specific admissions had been requested. The chief
use of admission procedure in such a form is as a tactical
weapon, rather than as a means of eliminating undisputed
items of proof.'"
A discovery-skeptic both in the 1930s and today might share the
concerns expressed during the Advisory Committee drafting process
or in the debates about the Federal Rules:'° 7 that expanded discovery
provisions, combined with the adversarial nature of lawyers and their
clients and the natural desire of attorneys to earn a good living, would
result in extreme attempts to resist disclosure and to discover every
shred of potential evidence; that the actual utilization of discovery or
lm See id. at 188.
1 ° 1 See RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 188.
I " See id. Ragland stated that a "[sipecial provision is made in many jurisdictions for inspec-
tion of documents which are referred to in the pleadings." Id.
1°s
	
at 190. He also noted that courts were "rather equally divided" on their inherent power
to order a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination prior to trial, but that there was "one line
of authority, headed by the United States Supreme Court, which has held quite flatly that courts
have no such power." Id. at 191 (citing, among other cases, Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1890)).
I" See id. at 195.
1 °5 Id. at 201.
1 " RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 201 (citations omitted).
1117 See infra text accompanying notes 159-218.
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even the threat thereof would dramatically influence what cases are
brought and how they are settled in ways that may not reflect the true
merits of a lawsuit or potential lawsuit; that expansive discovery provi-
sions would require courts to spend significant time ruling on discov-
ery motions; and that expanded discovery would diminish the use and
importance of trial in open court.
I have left Ragland's description of written interrogatory practice
to the end because this is the place that a discovery-skeptic would have
found the most cause for alarm on most of these counts. Ragland listed
ten states with rules or statutes that permitted written interrogatories.'''
He wrote that "[olne of the most troublesome problems in some
American jurisdictions, notably in Massachusetts, has been whether a
party may file as many questions as he chooses to." '°° He related that
in Massachusetts prior to 1929, when a thirty number limit was intro-
duced,"° there
was no limit to the number of interrogatories that might be
filed. In one case, 2258 interrogatories were filed. Gradually
there came into use mimeographed and printed forms which
contained two, three and four hundred interrogatories.
These questions were not prepared with reference to the
particular case in which they were to be used, but were stock
forms entirely. Their most widespread use was in automobile
accident litigation. One of the purposes in using so many
questions was to put each principal question in so many forms
that evasion would be difficult."'
Ragland cited this justification of the form interrogatory practice
from an insurance company brief in a 1929 Massachusetts case:
"where plaintiffs' lawyers flood the courts with thousands of cases
where merit does not exist, or is very doubtful, there is no sense or
reason for the defendant trying to get up a special set of interroga-
tories where the same principles are involved . . . ."" 2 Ragland re-
ported that interrogatory practice in Massachusetts "became ex-
tremely burdensome upon the courts. Almost all of the various
motion hours were taken up in deciding objections to interrogato-
ries. Oftentimes the questions asked, as applied to the particular
I " See RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 92. The states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington. See id.
1 °2 1d. at 93.
"° Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
" 2 Id. at 93-94.
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case, were quite ludicrous. The burden on the clerk's office was
surprisingly heavy."'"
An additional problem with interrogatories is how difficult it is for
the questioner to obtain a responsive answer. "Of course, as a practical
matter," Ragland wrote, "one of the chief complaints with the written
interrogatory procedure is that answers usually are so evasive as to give
little enlightenment."" 4
 Ragland suggested that "[t] here are several
administrative problems involved in deciding objections and compel-
ling answers to written interrogatories," and that although a numeric
limitation on interrogatories eased the burden, "there is still a consid-
erable administrative burden upon the court in connection with inter-
rogatories."'" He ended this chapter of his book by noting the exist-
ence of the same problems under federal equity practice, quoting
Wallace R. Lane: "'In some instances quite as much time of the court
has been taken in hearing arguments concerning interrogatories and
deciding what should or should not be answered, as is occupied in the
actual trial of the case. , ”116
To Ragland's credit, although he concluded by supporting discov-
ery in an enthusiastic way, he did not, as we have repeatedly seen, eli-
minate evidence of the negative aspects of discovery from his book."'
Ragland's last chapter, entitled "Contribution of Discovery to the
General Administration of Justice," provided many stories and quotes
from lawyers expressing their enthusiasm for expanded discovery. In
so doing, he laid out the pro-discovery arguments that became the
underpinnings for the pro-discovery rationale of Sunderland and oth-
ers."8
 Here is some vintage Ragland:
113 RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 94 (citations omitted). Ragland added that in "Washington,
one hundred and sixty interrogatories were filed in one case," but he noted that reducing the
number of permitted interrogatories or confining their permissible scope resulted in 'less
trouble" in other American states. Id. at 94. He also wrote that in "the few states in which both
an oral examination for discovery and one upon written interrogatories are allowed, there is no
need nor desire to increase the number of the written interrogatories. Rather they arc used, if
at all, for the purpose of obtaining a few formal admissions." Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted).
"4 Id. at 95.
"5 Id. at 114,119. (citations omitted).
116 1d. at 119 (quoting Lane, supra note 54, at 276, 294).
117 Instead, he explained how more discovery, or a particular rule or device, would eliminate
or diminish the problem. See id. at 94-95. For instance, he argued that combining expansive oral
discovery with written interrogatories, and reducing their number, would reduce the overuse of
interrogatories. See id, at 95. He also tied his discussion of discovery to other potential improve-
ments in procedure, such as judicial supervision of discovery and expanded use of summary
judgment. See id. at 217-19.
118 See infra text accompanying notes 142-58.
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Judges and lawyers in the states which allow a full and mutual
discovery before trial say that it has had a salutary effect upon
the whole tenor of the litigious process. Perhaps their views
can best be summarized by quoting two terse sentences which
are representative of the views encountered in field investiga-
tions in the various states:
"Litigation is no longer regarded as a game.
"The lawyer who does not use discovery procedure is in the
position of a physician who treats a serious case without first
using the X-ray.""9
Both themes draw on portions of an emerging procedural philoso-
phy whose origins may be traced to Roscoe Pound's famous speech
entitled The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice,' 2° in which Pound urged that lawyers give up their "sporting
theory ofjustice"'and that society turn to scientific legal experts to help
solve the complicated problems of the new century. 121 Ragland similarly
argued that discovery would help focus controversies on the real and
disputed issues and would make trials and settlements more rational.
Discovery, he urged, would greatly reduce arguments over pleadings
because relevant information could be obtained through this alterna-
tive and better method. Discovery was also a means of preserving
testimony:
The basic reasons why a full and equal discovery is acceptable
to lawyers are that it furnishes a means of thorough prepara-
tion for trial, and that it makes possible the disposal of many
cases without protracted litigation, the collection of fees ear-
lier, and the handling of a greater volume of litigation.' 22
Here is how Ragland ended the narrative portion of his book:
The work of the judge is simplified in the states which employ
an oral examination before trial. A considerable part of the
pre-trial machinery for the formulation of the terms of the
controversy becomes extra-judicial in practical operation. A
great many cases are eliminated before they ever reach the
trial dockets. The greater clarity in the definition of the issues
119 RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 251.
12°Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofjustice, 29
REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF TILE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 395 (1906).
121 /d. at 404. Pound compared law and lawyers to engineering formulas and engineers. See
id, at 401.
122 RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 266,
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and the elimination of elements of surprise expedites the
actual trial in cases which must be tried. In many respects,
therefore, discovery has made a vital contribution to the
general administration of justice. 123
V. CHARLES E. CLARK AND His PROCEDURAL VIEWS
On June 3, 1935, the United States Supreme Court appointed an
Advisory Committee "to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of a
unified system of rules . . . . "124
 The fourteen person committee was
composed of nine lawyers, five law professors and no sitting judges.' 25
The two major drafters of the Federal Rules were Charles Clark, then
Dean of the Yale Law School, who was named Reporter to the Advisory
Committee, and Edson Sunderland, who was also named a member of
the original Advisory Committee. Sunderland, a professor at Michigan
Law School, was primarily responsible for the initial drafting of the
rules relating to discovery and summary judgment. 126 Both were rela-
tive late-comers to the Enabling Act debate and not central figures in
that contest."'
Clark did not write about discovery during the Enabling Act de-
bate; indeed, prior to his appointment to the Advisory Committee, he
rarely wrote about it at all. 128
 The list of prospective procedural reforms
1 " Id.
124
 Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S.
774 (1934).
125 See id.
126
 See Clark, supra note 40, at 10. On September 7, 1935, Sunderland wrote Clark that, "I
hope I may be able to send you a draft of summary judgment rules within a week or two, and a
draft of rules for general discovery not so long thereafter." Letter from Edson R. Sunderland to
Dean Charles E. Clark (Sept. 7, 1935) (on file with the Charles E. Clark Papers, Sterling Memorial
Library of Yale University, Manuscripts and Archives [hereinafter Clark Papers], Box 108, Folder
43).
127 In 1926, however, Clark wrote a popular piece for the American Mercury on procedural
reform and the Supreme Court. See Charles E. Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court,
AMERICAN MERCURY, 1926, at 445. He supported the effort to reform federal procedure and
urged "that its details should'be worked out by experts . ," but that the Supreme Court was
"lamentably insufficient" for that task because of the pressure of their work load and because
"Whey are removed from the tribulations of trial practice, and can be expected to manifest little
more than impatience at the troubles, which doubtless seemed tor them overmagnified, of the
trial judge and counsel." Id. at 450. He supported then Chief Justice Taft's proposal that there
be a commission of experts. See id. at 946-49.
126
 In 1933, Clark wrote a brief but laudatory review of Ragland's hook, Discovery Before Trial.
See generally Clark, supra note 75. From the time Clark became interested in procedure in the
early 1920s, he wrote primarily about pleading and joinder questions, although in 1929 he
co-authored an article about summary judgment. See Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow,
The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE Lj. 423 (1928-1929). A note on the first page stated: 'This article
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in Clark's 1928 Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading did not include
discovery) 29 In the second edition, published in 1947, nine years after
the Federal Rules became law, he wrote of discovery as one of the "new
procedural devices" in his introductory chapter on history and added
a new six-page section after summary judgment on "Discovery De-
vices."' 5° His "black letter" introduction to this section summarized the
relationship that he saw between pleading (his field of expertise) and
discovery:
The inadequacy of the disclosure given by the pleadings as a
basis for trial has led to the utilization of depositions and
other discovery devices which allow the parties to investigate
the factual basis of the litigation. Although full discussion of
discovery is outside the scope of this book, the discovery
mechanisms are described, since they are a necessary supple-
ment to the system of simplified pleading supported herein. 131
In 1933, two years before Clark became Reporter, he wrote posi-
tively about the potential of new and expanded discovery techniques
in a brief review of George Ragland's book.'" Moreover, Clark's firm
commitment, along with other legal realists, to the importance of
accumulating data in order to understand and act upon important
legal and social-political problems was certainly consonant with what
later became the expanded Federal Rule discovery provisions)"
is an amplification of a report prepared for the Connecticut judicial Council in the spring of
1928." Id.
129 See CLARK, supra note 15, at 31-38. Although the title of the section is "Future Pleading
Reform," he discussed such matters as unified courts, masters, simplified appellate practice, jury
trial, summary judgment on motion and declaratory judgment.. See id.
i" See CLARK, supra note 4, at 567.
131 Id. at 41,567-72.
132 See generally Clark, supra note 75. In 1929, Clark mentioned "discovery under modern
statutes" as a topic investigated at Yale on behalf of the Connecticut judicial Council, but he
looked to trial rather than discovery for bringing out facts, See Charles E. Clark, Methods of Legal
Reform, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 106,112-14 (1929).
1" See Subrin, supra note 14, at 967-68, But what Clark had written extensively about before
his appointment as Reporter was the wastefulness of detailed pleadings and pleading disputes
and the efficacy of expanded joinder of issues and parties. He did not think that most lawyers
were sufficiently skilled to meet rigorous pleading requirements. He also did not believe that
elaborate pleadings were a useful way to expose facts or narrow issues. He repeatedly looked to
equity as an example of how the pleadings should permit a recitation of the plaintiff's story,
whether short or long, as well as the model for the provision of expanded joinder; he complained
that the Field Code stopped short of sufficiently simple pleading and broad joinder. See ed. at
961-73. If the pleadings did not have to recite the facts of the case in any great detail, discovery
perhaps becomes a natural, if not necessary, ingredient of procedure. But I have been unable to
find any place where Clark makes this connection between liberal pleading and the need for
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After his appointment as Reporter, Clark also wrote an article in
the Yale Law Journal with James William Moore, entitled A New Federal
Civil Procedure, II: Pleadings and Parties,'" which was published shortly
after the Advisory Committee was appointed. Clark urged once again
the use of the Uniform Equity Rules of 1912 as the basis for a merged
procedural system of law and equity. As he had for the previous decade,
he argued for simple, flexible rules, leaving much to the discretion of
the trial judge. These rules "will provide the central framework of the
new structure, although many important details dealing with matters
as important as evidence and appellate review, process, venue, sum-
mary judgments, declaratory judgments, discovery, and motion and
trial practice must be left for consideration at another time."'" Under
the title Miscellaneous Pleading Rules, Clark suggested that motions to
make more definite and certain, and motions for bills of particulars,
"need to be supplemented by modern methods of discovery" because
"they result in supplementary pleading, and are hedged about by
conditions."' 36
On June 14, 1935, Clark sent former Solicitor and then Attorney
General William Dewitt Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Commit-
tee, his ideas for an agenda for the first Advisory Committee meeting,
adding "[p] lease, of course, use or discard this as you see fit."'" Under
separate cover, he sent the Yale Law Journal article.'" Clark's memo
expanded discovery prior to his becoming Reporter. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E.
Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) (providing a more complete summary
of Clark's views on procedure).
"4
 Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II: Pleadings and
Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935) [hereinafter Clark, New Federal Civil Procedure II]. In the first
article they wrote together, Clark & Moore argued that the Supreme Court should take advantage
of the section of the Enabling Act of 1934 that permitted the Supreme Court to draft rules for
a merged system of law and equity. See generally Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New
Federal Civil Procedure 1: The Background, 44 YALE 14. 387 (1935) [hereinafter Clark, New Federal
Civil Procedure 1]. The story of this article and its influence is told lb Subrin, supra note 133.
115 Clark, New Federal Civil Procedure I, supra note 134, at 1292 (emphasis added).
155 1d. at 1309-10 (emphasis added) (citations, including one to Itikut.ANtn, supra note 31,
have been omitted in this quotation). Clark and Moore also wrote this enticing sentence in a
footnote after mentioning Ragland and instructing the reader to "Compare Equity rule 58." They
stated: "Treatment of this subject will be considered in an article dealing with proof." Id. at 1310
11.83.
' 57 Copy of letter from Clark to Honorable William D. Mitchell (lure 14, 1935), in Clark
Papers, supra note 126, at Box 108, Folder 42. Clark attached a two-page memorandum proposing
an agenda for the June 20th meeting entitled, "Meeting of the Advisory Committee of the
Supreme Court of the United States on Rules of Civil Procedure, Chicago (June 20, 1935)." See
id.
138 See id. The article was entitled, A New Federal Civil Procedure. II: Pleadings and Parties. See
Clark, A New Federal Civil Procedure II, supra note 134.
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included this question: "What action, if any, is to be taken on the
following subjects: venue; process; summary judgment; motion for
judgment by defendant support by affidavits; discovery; rules under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act?" His list of particular problems
of detailed draftsmanship included several pleading and joinder issues,
but did not mention discovery.'4°
Clark's reticence about discovery was probably due to several
factors. He was uncertain whether discovery would be covered by the
new rules and he did not consider himself a pretrial discovery expert.
We have seen how little he had published about the topic. Clark later
explained, in an article written after Sunderland's death, that he very
much wanted Sunderland on the Advisory Committee because of his
expertise in the field of pretrial practice, including discovery.''"
VI. EDSON SUNDERLAND: CHAMPION OF DISCOVERY
Ragland was by no means the only or earliest strong proponent
of discovery, although his book was probably the most influential single
source of support for the Federal Rules reformers. Robert Millar, the
Northwestern University Law School scholar whom Clark effectively
kept off of the initial Advisory Committee,' 42 observed that "[o]ne of
the few blemishes that Blackstone permitted himself to impute to the
common-law system was its lack of any means of discovery." 143 In the
late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth, bar asso-
ciations and study commissions, particularly in the state of New York,
repeatedly attempted to expand the scope of oral depositions and
discovery of documents.'" Fleming James had written positively about
139 Copy of Letter from Clark to Honorable William D. Mitchell, supra note 137.
too
	 id.
141 See Clark, supra note 90, at 10; see dlso Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 918 (1970) (stating that Clark knew very little
about pretrial conference (Rule 16) and the deposition and discovery rules (Rules 26-37) and
that Sunderland had drafted these provisions, as well as the motion for summary judgment rule
(Rule 56)). Others and I have explained elsewhere how Clark kept Sunderland from being
appointed as Reporter, based on what Clark thought were his misguided views on not wanting
complete merger of law and equity and continuing to want federal practice to conform to state
practice. But, because of Sunderland's expertise, Clark then urged Mitchell to have Hughes still
appoint Sunderland to the Committee. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1136 n.539; Subrin, supra
note 133, at 132-37.
"2 See Subrin, supra note 133, at 138.
"3 Millar, supra note 28, at 201 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 382).
144 See, e.g., 22 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 191 (1899); see also REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON A PLAN FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF
TIIE CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE STATE 12,132-69 (1912).
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discovery in 1929 and Millar had done the same in 1932, the same year
as Ragland's book Discovery Before TriaL' 45
But it was Edson Sunderland whom Clark and Mitchell chose to
write the summary judgment and discovery rules when the Committee
commenced its drafting process in 1935. 18 Sunderland was a well-es-
tablished scholar at Michigan Law School whom Clark, when Dean at
Yale Law School, had brought to Yale to be a research associate on the
Sterling Foundation between 1931 and 1933.' 47 Since 1920, Sunderland
had been writing about the glories of English procedure, including
simple pleading, broader joinder of parties and claims, expanded
discovery and the summons for directions. He marveled at how ef-
ficiently skilled judges and masters, and civilized, well-educated, disci-
plined lawyers, joined together in formulating sensible pretrial discov-
ery. English procedure utilized summary judgment when that made
sense and when necessary, participated in focused, speedy trials in
which judges were very much in control, guiding juries to correct
verdicts.' 48
 Early on, Sunderland realized that equity was correct in
having a more flexible and expansive procedure; that England was less
bound by precedents and more experimental and forward in the
development of procedure; and that the average American lawyer was
so bound by outdated formalistic practices that any reform initiated by
the leaders of the bar would be fought by the bulk of the profession. 149
146 See Robert Wyness Millar, . The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil
Procedure, 32 ILL, L. REV. 424, 448 (1937-1938). See generally Fleming James, Jr., Discovery, 38 YALE
L.J. 746 (1929).
146 See Clark, supra note 40, at 10.
t47 See id. at 7.
148 See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 MICH. L. REV. 109
(1925); Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725
(1926) [hereinafter Sunderland, English Struggle].
146
 See Sunderland, English Struggle, supra note 148, at 726, 739-45; Edson R. Sunderland,
Joinder of Actions, 18 Mimi. L. REV. 571 (1920). In this article Sunderland stated:
[C]onservatism in remedial law is a much more marked professional trait than
conservatism in other legal fields, for the reason that the public does not under-
stand it and cannot step in so readily and demand relief . . . .
There is a further striking failure which must be charged to the legal profession
in America, which grows out of the one just noted, and that is its ignorance of and
indifference to improvements in procedural practice developed in other jurisdic-
tions. It is safe to say that if a new method of treating cancer were discovered and
successfully employed in England, every intelligent doctor in the world would
almost immediately know about it and attempt to take advantage of it. But it is
equally safe to say that if a new and successful method of treating some procedural
problem were discovered in England, American lawyers as a class would remain in
substantial ignorance of it for at least two generations, and would probably treat it
with scornful indifference for a generation or two more . . . As long as clients
continue to come and the machinery of law continues to move, he [the American
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Sunderland's articles about discovery reflected his disdain for
formalistic limitations and his desire for a more common sense all-en-
compassing procedure. In 1933, he published Scope and Method of
Discovery Before Trial in the Yale Law Journal.' 50 He explained the
limitations of pleadings and written interrogatories, limitations that are
all too well-known to any litigator. Sunderland argued that the equity
discovery rules discussed earlier did not go far enough towards allow-
ing oral depositions.' 51 Unlike Ragland, Sunderland did not suggest
lawyer) is as free from concern over the methods used elsewhere as the southern
negro [sic] with his mule and little plow, who never worries about tractors or other
new-fangled devices.
No better illustration of this can be found than the problem of joinder of causes
of action  Most of the restrictions which the law placed upon such joinder can
be shown by experience to he useless. One jurisdiction has progressed here, another
there. But no jurisdiction, excepting perhaps Great Britain and its dominions, has
consolidated and assembled the various improvements which have been developed
into an enlightened and comprehensive system, nor has there ever been any interest
shown by the rank and file of American lawyers in studying the operations of new
rules in this field ....
Sunderland, joinder of Actions, supra, at 572. Tin England, English precedents seemed to have
a weaker hold on the profession than in America, and the rules drawn under the judicature Act
of 1873 are so simple and reasonable that one almost wonders whether they were really drawn
by lawyers." Id. at 584.
150 Sunderland, supra note 27, at 863.
151 See id. He summarized that old argument that one should not discover the opponent's
case because that will invite perjury, in that party A, now knowing what party 13 contends, will
alter testimony in order to defeat party A's contentions. "Perjury," Sunderland contended, "is one
of the great bugaboos of the law. Every change in procedure by which the disclosure of the truth
has been made easier has raised the spectre of perjury to frighten the professions." Id. at 867. He
suggested that perjury perhaps was really not "so terrifying to the profession" as they pretended.
Id. at 868.
It is easy for those who are interested in opposing change to conjure up visions of
calamities which the change will precipitate, and to persuade themselves of the
reality of the dangers which serve so useful in [sic] purpose as a deterrent from the
course which they disapprove
Mt is also to be observed, in the present instance, that the restrictions upon
discovery not only produced an enormous amount of lucrative litigation over the
application of the rules, which the reported cases abundantly show, but they pre-
served enough uncertainty in the trial of cases so that a lawyer might always feel
confident of having a fighting chance of success no matter what side of any case
he might be employed to represent.
Id. He suggested that if litigation remains a lottery, "modern business men will decline to use IL"
Id. at 869. Sunderland explained that many jurisdictions have provided both sides equal discovery
of facts, whether to prove their own case or defeat the case of their opponent. Citing Ragland's
book and his field studies, Sunderland contended that "[liar from encouraging perjury, unre-
stricted mutual discovery has been found by experience to be one of the greatest preventitives
of perjury." Id. at 872. Moreover, Sunderland contended that discovery unrestricted to the case
of the party asking for it would multiply the opportunities for plaintiffs to achieve summary
judgment because they would be able to show the lack of any realistic defense. Set id. at 872-73.
716	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:691
oral depositions of all witnesses in this article. But in a less scholarly
article written the same year entitled Improving the Administration of
Civil Justice, Sunderland made an argument for eliminating virtually
all limitations on all types of known discovery techniques. 152
 In this
article, which appeared in The Annals of American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Sunderland previewed the wide-open, multiple dis-
covery techniques that he drafted two years later on behalf of the
Advisory Committee.
Sunderland attacked the failure of pleadings to convey meaning-
ful information. This he attributed to what he called the "ex parte"
nature of the drafting of pleadings.'" "As long as each litigant draws
his own statements of his position, he will endeavor to do so in such a
way as to give himself the widest freedom of action at the trial and at
the same time convey as little information as possible to his adver-
sary. "154
 Sunderland turned next to a plea for enlarged discovery: "Only
by a preliminary proceeding in which each party may call upon the
other to submit himself and his witnesses to interrogation under oath,
can the true nature of the controversy be satisfactorily ascertained."'"
Among the many benefits he saw for expanded discovery were the
following: the elimination of surprise; preserving testimony so it will
be available in case of the death or other unavailability of a witness;
diminishing the importance of pleadings; increasing "the effectiveness
of the summary judgment"; focusing the trial on "the main points in
controversy"; and permitting each side to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases in advance, frequently making trials unnec-
essary because of informed settlement.'" Examining discovery prac-
tices among the many states, Sunderland concluded that "[m]ost of
the restrictions upon the free use of discovery are not only unnecessary
but cause an enormous amount of trouble to the parties and the courts
in construing and applying them." 57
152 Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, in 167 ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL aNn SOCIAL SCIENCE 60-83 (1933).
155
 See id. al 73-74.
154 Id.
155 1d. at 74.
156 See id. at 74-75.
157 Sunderland, supra note 152, at 75-76. According to Sunderland, these restrictions were
the result of the "traditional feeling on the part of lawyers that discovery is a dangerous practice
which encourages the production of framed-up cases and of fictitious evidence to meet the facts
which the examination has brought out." Id. at 76. But, Sunderland argued that the opposite was
true, finding that when discovery was "fully available to both parties," there were better oppor-
tunities for testing the truthfulness of witnesses. See id. Furthermore, when both parties have
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Sunderland's last words on this subject will remind the reader of
Ragland:
Lawyers who constantly employ it in their practice find it an
exceedingly valuable aid in promoting justice. Discovery pro-
cedure serves much the same function in the field of law as
the X-ray in the field of medicine and surgery; and if its use
can be sufficiently extended and its methods simplified, liti-
gation will largely cease to he a game of chance. 158
VII. THE DRAFTING PROCESS: ADVISORY COMMITTEE CONCERNS
ABOUT DISCOVERY AND THE REJECTION OF CONSTRAINTS
The first meeting of the Advisory Committee was on June 20,1935.
Here is what was decided:
It was agreed that such matters as the method of taking
depositions, examinations before trial, discovery, and subjects
of that nature, being procedural, are within the scope of the
statute, but that rewriting the rules of evidence is not.
The consensus of opinion was also that procedure and
practice in the matter of summary judgments and declaratory
judgments should be dealt with by the rules.
It was also the consensus of opinion that the subjects of
examination before trial and discovery are within the proper
scope of the new rules, but that care must be taken to prevent
such procedure from being used as a basis for annoyance and
blackmail, and that possibly it is desirable to have such pro-
ceedings conducted by a master or magistrate having power
to rule on questions in order to prevent abuse.
It was then unanimously resolved that the committee
should be conservative as to the fields to be covered by the
rules, but within the fields which the rules do cover the
committed themselves, Sunderland argued, "it is exceedingly difficult for either one to shift his
position by manufacturing evidence." Id.
I " Id. In another portion of the article, Sunderland discussed the problems implicit in having
juries decide facts, including jurors' lack of training and their being "subject to the influences of
. . [their] own opinions, prejudices, and preconceptions." Id. at 77. He then explained why
judges should be able to summarize the evidence and otherwise advise juries. See id. at 77-80.
The pro-judge and anti-jury tenor of the article is in keeping with the Federal Rules ideology
from the conservative inception of the Enabling Act through its passage as New Deal legislation.
See Suhrin, supra note 14, at 943-44.
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committee should go as far as may be necessary to liberalize
the procedure and reach a result that will do quick and
accurate justice.
. . . .
The reporter undertook at an early stage to prepare a rough
outline of the subjects to be dealt with in the new rules, copies
to be distributed to members of the committee. 159
Sunderland was not present at this first meeting,1 6° but he was
assigned the task of drafting the summary judgment and discovery
rules; he was also instrumental in what ultimately became the pretrial
conference rule. So far as I have been able to ascertain (by comparing
his draft with Ragland's book), his initial draft included every type of
discovery that was known in the United States and probably England
up to that time. The list is familiar to any American litigator, for almost
every type of discovery he drafted became and remains part of the
Federal Rules: oral and written depositions; written interrogatories;
motions to inspect and copy documents and to inspect tangible and
real property; physical and mental examination of persons; and re-
quests for admissions. Sunderland also included a method for what we
now call mandatory disclosure: a means to force the opponent to
"furnish adequately descriptive lists of documents, books, accounts,
letters or other papers, photographs, or tangible things, which are
known to him and are relevant to the pending cause or to any desig-
159 Summary of Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules, Held
in the Federal Building at Chicago, June 20, 1935, in RECORDS OF TUE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE:
COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, at CI-103-42-46 (Congres-
sional Information Service) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE]. The
summary also included another important decision: "It was thereupon unanimously resolved, that
as the committee is acting in an advisory capacity only, no publicity be given to any action or
decision taken by it, except to the extent authorized by the Supreme Court." Id. at CI-I03-43.
Clark's outline of June 28th, which he called "purely tentative in form," included a part on
"Discovery and Summary Proceedings," and contemplated rules on three topics: "50. Discovery;
51. Summary Judgment; 52. Defendant's Motion for Judgment Supported by Affidavits." See
Supreme Court of the United States Advisory Committee on Rule's of Civil Procedure Topical
Outline of Proposed Rules (June 28, 1935) I, 5, in Clark Papers, supra note 126, at Box 108,
Folder 43. His note said: "Liberal provisions should he drafted on all these matters, Cf. RACLAND,
DISCOVERY (1931) ... [and two other citations]." Id. at 5. He then listed the Equity Rules that
should he "studied and annotated" and included in the list of the federal deposition statutes. Id.
IN See Report of Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee to the Supreme
Court of the United States 1 (June 20, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 159, at CI-101-1. The transcripts of the February 20-25 Advisory Committee meetings
can be found in one of two places: either in Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference or in the
collections of papers kept by the participants which were donated to several different institutions
across the country. For more information on these papers and where they may be found, see
Burbank, supra note 5, at 532-33 n.529.
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nated part thereof . . .";" but this did not become a part of the 1938
Rules.
Sunderland frankly told the Advisory Committee that he did not
have precedent for the combination of liberalized discovery that he
had drafted.' 62 If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted
in individual state courts, one finds some precursors to what later
became discovery under the Federal Rules; but at the time Sunderland
drafted what became the federal discovery rules, no one state allowed
the total panoply of devices. 16' Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they
became law in 1938, eliminated features of discovery that in some states
had curtailed the scope of discovery and the breadth of its use. During
Advisory Committee meetings, Sunderland admitted that he was going
further than any single jurisdiction's discovery provisions. As he com-
mented on his discovery drafting:
There is no very well settled system which will embrace the
various objects that I have sought to attain . . . . [O]ne Rule
would be supported by experience in one State or jurisdic-
tion, and another by experience in another State or jurisdic-
tion. You cannot find justification for all of these anywhere.
It is strictly an eclectic provision which I have brought in
here. . . . It was an entirely new subject matter. Now I might
say that I made very little use [sic] the Equity Rules or Federal
statutes, because they have only in the very slightest degree
provided for what I tried to do . . 1"
161 Rule 57(a), Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct. 16, 1935, in RECORDS OF Tam U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-804-22. Rule 57(a) was entitled, "Interrogatories Regarding
Documents and Tangible Things." See id.
Isu See. Proceedings of Advisory Committee on Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Court of the United States (Nov. 17, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 159, at C1-113-92 [hereinafter Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Nov. 17,
1935)].
le State experimentation with expanded discovery, however, had hastened during the first
five years of the 1930s. By the time Sunderland started drafting the federal discovery rules in
1935, sonic slates had gone beyond what Ragland had reported only a few years before. For
instance, hi Illinois, where the oral deposition "had long been applicable to chancery causes, it
MIS in 1933 made part of the apparatus of discovery in the unified procedure established by the
Practice Act of that year." Millar, supra note 28, at 211-12. Requests for the admission of facts
were permitted in Michigan in 1931 and Illinois in 1933. Also in 1933, the Illinois Civil Practice
Act permitted a party to force the opposing party to provide a list of relevant documents and to
list which they will permit inspection of and which they object to producing. See id. at 225.
Michigan (1931) and Illinois (1933) adopted motions for summary judgment in a manner which
permitted the defendant in the case of certain designated defenses to proceed by way of motion
to dismiss, even where the defense is not apparent on the face of the complaint or declaration
and involves the determination of a controverted question of fact." Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
tea Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Nov. 17, 1935), supra note 162, at CI-I 13-92; see
also Alexander Holtzo!T, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L.
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A brief look at what happened to Sunderland's discovery rules
during the Advisory Committee's deliberations is instructive, for the
drafters and other commentators touched upon many of the problems
and possibilities we currently consider. The main thrust of the story is
that constraints on wide-open discovery were either deleted from initial
drafts or, although discussed, did not make it to a draft.' 65
Some members of the Advisory Committee had deep concerns
about the problems inherent in liberal discovery; they also feared that
discovery opponents might succeed in defeating the entire set of rules.
George Wickersham died before the Advisory Committee completed
its work, but prior to his death he expressed his concerns about liberal
discovery. 166 Others echoed Wickersham's concern about "fishing ex-
peditions," specifically that oral depositions could spin out of control
unless a master was appointed to preside over depositions and rule on
admissibility questions. 167 When Wickersham died, the Supreme Court
appointed Senator George Wharton Pepper to replace him. 168 Here is
one exchange Pepper had with Mitchell, that evidences Pepper's res-
ervations about depositions:
Rev. 1057, 1072 (1955). Sunderland added: "A dozen or fifteen states have a procedure along
these lines. England has such a procedure. All the English self-governing dominions have a
procedure of this type.... I think it is an advance over what any one of those states have. But I
think it is not an advance over what can be found in these states taken together." Proceedings of
the Advisory Committee (Nov. 17, 1935), supra note 162, at CI-113-92. Holtzoff compiled many
quotes by Sunderland and other Advisory Committee members in this article. Holtzoff's study
was "prepared for the Institute ofJudicial Administration ...." Holtzoff, supra, at 1057. He stated
that he "is indebted to Mr. Leland L. Tolman, the Secretary of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for access to the stenographic minutes of the meetings of the
Committee, which contain a great deal of valuable material and throw an illuminating light on
the subject of this article. The author has drawn on these minutes to a considerable extent." Id.
The stenographic record of the original Advisory Committee's meetings during their drafting
period of 1935-1938 are available at a number of different locations. See Burbank, supra note 5,
at 1132 n.529; see also Peter Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation, Preliminary
Notes for Decoding the Deliberations of the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 37 Am. J. LEGAL HIST, 409, 413-14 n.22 (1993).
I 65 This momentum toward what the drafters called "liberal" discovery gained yet more
momentum in the decade after the federal rules became law, which resulted in even greater
liberalization of many of the discovery rules in 1946. See infra text accompanying notes 239-61.
IN See Mr. Wickersham's Memorandum Regarding Professor Sunderland's Draft of Rules 28
to 42, Regarding Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments [Dec. 18, 1935), in Recoups
OF THE H.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-1921-25—CI-1921-27.
167 See Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisor) , Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure
of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 1936), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-209-59-61 [hereinafter Proceedings of the Advisory Committee
(Feb. 22, 1935)].
168 Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936).
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Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, I am not worried about the
fishing-expedition aspect of this thing, but, in the part of the
country I come from, I know perfectly well that this sort of
power given to a plaintiff is simply going to be used as a
means of ruining the reputation of responsible people. You
bring a suit against a man, without any ground whatever—the
president of some important company, the president of a
utilities company or a bank or something. You take his depo-
sition, have the reporters present, and grill him in the most
unfair way, intimating that he is a burglar or murderer, or
this, that, and the other. I-Ie has no redress, and the next
morning the papers have a whole lot of front-page stuff. The
case never goes any further. That is all that was intended.
The Chairman. It is too much like some of these Senate
committees you used to sit on. (Laughter)
Mr. Pepper. Exactly; and that is where I got a taste of the kind
of lawlessness that ruins people's reputations without the
opportunity ever to redress the harm that is done.
I do not think there is anything worse than the use of
judicial proceedings for the creation of a forum from which,
through the newspapers, to harangue the public. The defen-
dant is perfectly helpless. There is no restraint upon the
examination. This business of getting a high-class man to sit
there and listen in [referring to the possibility of using mas-
ters to superintend depositions] increases the audience for
the publication of the slander, but that is all it does.
I do not like the attitude of mind that suggests that the
thing to do is to make a vicious practice sound well or look
well. It seems to me that the whole thing is vicious, and the
only reason I am not worried more about it is that I am
morally certain that it will never get by the Supreme Court, I
do not care how you dress it up.
The Chairman. It is a system that is in use in a great many
States in the union, and has been for year [sic].
Mr. Morgan. It is a system that is growing by leaps and
bounds.
Mr. Dodge. In some way the courts must have control over
the proceedings, and power to check abuses.' 69
169 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Feb. 22, 1935), supra note 167, at CI-209-59—CI-
209-60.
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Dodge continued with the theme that had emerged in the first
meeting, that expanded discovery could be used as a means to black-
mail people or to force settlement.
In some way there must be opportunity to apply to the court
and say, "[t]his man is just summoning the president of this
corporation to ransack all his books and papers and he is just
keeping it going day after day to force a nuisance settlement
out of the company." In three or four days the president will
say, "Here, you have to settle this case. I am through with this."
In some way the court must have the power to check this.' 7°
At one point, Chairman Mitchell said in frustration: "I feel very
strongly as I did before. We are going to have an outburst against
this discovery business unless we can hedge it about with some
appearance of safety against fishing expeditions." 17 '
There are several examples of possible restraints on discovery that
did not survive the many drafts. One way to put limits on the entire
lawsuit, including the discovery stage, is to have more rigorous plead-
ing rules and then to tie the scope of discovery to pleading allegations.
Clark's initial two drafts of the pleading rules used such words as "acts,"
"occurrences" and "facts," before, largely at the suggestion of Senator
Pepper, the committee settled upon "claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relierm Clark's first draft had a pleading-verification
requirement making the lawyer's signature on pleadings a certificate
"that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, the matters
alleged or the denials made therein are true . .." 178 Sunderland's
initial draft of an oral deposition rule attempted to constrain the scope
of discovery by limiting it to "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the pending cause as shown in the pleadings on file therein
. "174 But Sunderland's limitation was mostly discarded. Clark
wanted to de-emphasize the importance of pleadings; many of the
members were wary of technical arguments over what in fact was
covered by the pleadings; and some depositions might be taken prior
to the completion of pleadings. 175 "Relevant to the subject matter
170 1d. at CI-209-60-0-209.61.
171 /d. at C1-206-59. Mitchell added: "Perhaps my suggestion is not feasible. Has anyone
another?" Id.
172 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 976.
I " Id. at 977 {quoting Rule 21, Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct. 15. 1935, in RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL. CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-803-88).
174 Rule 49, Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct. 18, 1935, in RECORDS OF THE U.S.,11mictiti. CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 159, at CI-804-16.
175 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 14, at 962-65; see also Subrin, supra note 133, at 119, 139-42.
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involved in the pending action," the language chosen in the 1938
deposition rule, was apt to lead to fewer discovery arguments. 178
Sunderland thought that numeric limits on interrogatories were
arbitrary; they were obviously not consistent with the wide-open discov-
ery he favored. 177 Sunderland's first draft, which in some ways sounded
like what later became the interrogatories rule, had this restraint that
was later deleted: ". . . the witness shall not be required to answer and
return the interrogatories unless there shall be paid or tendered to
him, at the time of delivering to him the interrogatories, a fee of two
dollars plus one dollar for every question in excess of twenty." 178
Some members of the Advisory Committee, especially the Chair-
man, were extremely negative about Clark's proposal that judges, upon
motion of a party or on their own, make what Clark called an "order
formulating issues to be tried." 17° The judges were to be permitted
"after hearing the parties," to find that there "is no real and substantial
dispute as to any one or more of the issues presented by the pleadings,"
to "order such issues to be disregarded" and to specify "issues as to
which there is any real and substantial dispute" to be tried. 18° The
proposed rule, as drafted, permitted the court, acting "upon motion
of any party or upon its own motion" at any time to make such an
order;' 81 consequently, such a pretrial order would be a way of limiting
discovery to the remaining issues. Mitchell argued that in many dis-
tricts, judges were too busy to perform the task of narrowing issues,
and that giving judges "power to exclude an issue from trial, against
the protest .of either party, merely because the judge thinks the evi-
dence is too flimsy . . . would produce an outcry from the bar, and
might operate to impair the right to jury trial."'" Clark's "order for-
170 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1), 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 148-58.
178 Rule 56(b) (5), Tentative Draft No. 1, in __Pircoups OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 159, at C1-804-22.
179 Rule 38, Tentative Draft No. 1, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Stipra. note
159, at CI-804-30; Rule 24, Tentative Draft No. 3, Mar. 1936, in RECORDS OF 'rim U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-809-92,
180 Rule 24, Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 179, at CI-809-92. A similar proposal was
contained in Rule 38, Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct. 15, 1935, in RECORDS  OF THE U.S, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-804-4.
181 Rule 24, Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 179, at CI-809-92. The rule began: "Wherever
[sic] the court, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion . ." Id. In the first tentative
draft, the rule began: "After the pleadings in an action have been completed, the court may .. „"
Rule 38, Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 180, at CI-804-50.
182 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Feb. 22, 1935), supra note 167, at CI-209-32.
Mitchell was also concerned that such issue-narrowing by judges would not be subject to review
on appeal. Id. Pepper said, jokingly I suppose, that the rule would have to be subject to
impeachment of the judge "if the court uses this opportunity to suggest a settlement, and tries
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mulating issues" provision became a watered down portion of Sunder-
land's pretrial conference rule.'"
Mitchell was particularly eager to find some way to protect wit-
nesses, and especially parties, from what he feared might be overreach-
ing oral depositions. Several pages of the AdvisOry Committee tran-
script deal with his suggestions. 184 His third suggestion, relying on New
York procedure, was to require the party seeking to depose to first go
to a judge for permission to take the deposition; 185 thereafter, the judge
could "specify the particular things you are going to be allowed to
inquire about. He makes an order defining the things you can fish
about. " 186
 But it turned out that the New York method was under attack
in New York,' 87 and Mitchell himself had doubts about his own sugges-
tion: "I think it is quite common in New York to make applications to
vacate the order. They keep bringing matters up, wanting to get it
limited, vacated, and restricted, and it makes an enormous amount of
preliminary litigation, which becomes quite a nuisance."I 88
Mitchell's first deponent-protective suggestion, in "order to palli-
ate the opposition to this rule, and prevent abuse,'''" was that when a
notice of deposition was served, "if the adverse party felt that there was
some abuse going to result, he could apply to the court for an order ap-
pointing a master with authority to take the evidence and rule on the
admission and exclusion of evidence." 199 But Mitchell felt, on reflec-
tion, that "this is too broad."19 ' His second suggestion was that an
adverse party could demand a master to rule on evidence only when
he, or if a corporation, its officers, agents or employees are the wit-
nesses to be examined.' 92
to make the parties settle. The thing that bothers me about these powers is that the modern
judges, not wanting to try difficult Cases, simply call counsel in and talk settlement to them, even
when the judge does not know much about it." Id. at CI-206-34.
1 °3 See FED. R. ON. P. 16, 308 U.S. 645 (1938), It listed the "simplification of issues" as one
of the matters that could be considered as part of pretrial procedure. See Id.
184 See Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Feb. 22, 1935), supra note 167, at CI-209-51-
CI-209-77.
185
 See id. at CI-209-75.
188 Id. at CI-209-64.
187 See id. (statement of Mr. Lemann).
188 Id. Indeed, Mr. Lemann said that the New York State Commission on Administration of
Justice for 1934 thought that the scope of the examination should "include all relevant matters,
and the elimination of any designation in the notice or order of the specific subject of the
deposition." Id.
189
 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Feb. 22, 1935), supra note 167, at C1-209-74—CI-
209-75.
195 1d. at CI-209-75.
191 Id,
192
 See id.
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In May 1936, the Advisory Committee presented a preliminary
draft to the Supreme Court. Forty-thousand copies were printed, and
the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee asked for com-
ments.'" The draft permitted a party, "upon whom notice to take a
deposition has been served," to make "a motion to have the deposition
taken before a master, with power to rule on evidence."' 91 In discussing
the preliminary draft at an ABA meeting called for that purpose,
Mitchell said, "[w]e are not here to defend this draft .. "195 He cau-
tioned that the Supreme Court had already decided to make changes
in the existing system and to merge law and equity procedure, and that
although "older members of the Bar may object to any change," an-
other generation will "welcome the abolition of antiquated systems,
familiarity with which demands additional labor, and which tend to
obstruct rather than to improve the efficiency of our judicial system."'"
Mitchell added that the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee
needed members of the Bar "to give this draft thoughtful considera-
tion, with sympathy for the difficulties of the task confronted by the
Advisory Committee, and to submit to the Advisory Committee con-
structive suggestions for improvement."' 97
Mitchell was entirely forthright in asking for advice on the discov-
ery provisions. His own concerns found their way into his address. He
explained the importance of "discovery and examination before trial,"
and warned that Islome modern rules on this subject are sure to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court."'" He acknowledged that it was
"a pleasant feeling" to be able to "have an ace up the sleeve which can
be sprung on one's adversary," but unpleasant to know that the oppo-
nent may be doing the same thing.
[W]e must admit that an efficient but well guarded system of
discovery and examination before trial is essential for the
proper administration of justice. Rules as liberal as those we
have proposed have been in use in the English courts for
155 SIT Joseph R. Taylor, Federal Procedure—The Cooperative Character Of The Present Effort, 22
A.B.A. J. 476, 476 (1936); see also Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal
Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 556 (1939).
154 Edward H. Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 629, 632 (1937).
1 ''' William D. Mitchell, Altitude of Advisory Committee—Events Leading to Proposal for Uniform
Rules—Problems an Which Discussion Is Invited, 22 A.R.A. J. 780, 780 (1956).
196 1d. at 781.
197 1d.
198 Id. at 782.
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many years. Similar systems are in effect in some States of the
Union)"
This, of course, was an exaggeration. The proposals went farther
than any single system anywhere. 20° Otherwise, Mitchell was ex-
tremely balanced in his approach, and seems to have genuinely
wanted help and suggestions from the practicing bar:
Rules on this subject should be carefully drawn to guard
against abuse, On the other hand, they should be sufficiently
liberal to accomplish the intended purpose. We ask particu-
larly for careful consideration of the proposed rules on this
subject. Will the Committee's proposals sufficiently guard
against abuse? Should the right of examination before trial
be limited to the parties, or extended to other witnesses? Any
suggestions you may make based on practical experience will
be gratefully received.20 '
The Bar definitely did not want to have masters appointed to
monitor depositions and rule on evidence, and this was eliminated in
the final draft that was presented to the Supreme Court and which
later became law. Edward H. Hammond, who was on the legal staff of
the Advisory Committee, explained that the final draft now permitted
parties and witnesses to move for protective orders, and that it retained
a provision that permitted "having the taking of the deposition stopped
if it is not being conducted in good faith or is being conducted for the
purpose of annoying, embarrassing or oppressing a party." 202 He also
explained that this provision now extended to non-party witnesses as
well. He continued:
It is thought that the provisions for the protection of parties
and witnesses just mentioned will afford at least as much
protection as was intended to be afforded by the master
under the old rule. Furthermore, that protection will now
199 Id.
200 Set supra text accompanying notes 162-64. Clark noted:
The system thus envisaged by Sunderland had no counterpart at the time he
proposed it. It goes very much beyond English procedure, which does not provide
for general depositions of parties or witnesses. And only sporadically was there to
be found here and there a suggestion fur some part of the proposed system, but
nowhere the fusion of the whole to make a complete system such as we ultimately
presented.
Clark, supra note 40, at 11 (citation omitted).
Y01
 Mitchell. supra note 195. at 782.
202 1-Iammoncl, supra note 194, at 631.
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come directly from the court itself. There was considerable
objection by the profession to the master rule, particularly to
the provision giving the power to rule on evidence and it was
thought that the power to exclude evidence might be so
exercised as to hamper the desired freedom of discovery. The
matter of costs in the way of master's fees and expenses might
also act as a deterrent to the use of discovery and would give
an unfair advantage to those more able to pay them. 2"'
There was yet another possible way to ease the potential burdens
of discovery. Maybe there should have been some kind of more auto-
matic disclosure, akin to what we now call "mandatory disclosure," in
which the opposition could be forced to list relevant documents. Sun-
derland's initial draft included a special provision for:
Interrogatories, Regarding Documents and Tangible
Things[:] A party, or the agent of a party, may be required,
by appropriate written interrogatories, to furnish adequately
descriptive lists of documents, books, accounts, letters or
other papers, photographs, or tangible things, which are
known to him and are relevant to the pending cause or to
any designated part thereof, and state regarding each ... .
who has custody, whether the party is willing to permit inspection,
copying, or photographing "and if unwilling, for what reason," and
"the time when and the place where such inspection, copying or
photographing may be had." 2"4 If the interrogated party does not
list an item, or will not permit inspection, the item may not be
admitted into evidence by the interrogated party. These provisions
were in the preliminary rules that were shown to the bar.
You can imagine the result. Martin Conboy of the New York Bar,
for instance, protested against oral depositions without requiring "the
right to judicial determination of the propriety of any question before
answer, particularly upon the examination of an adverse party." 2°5 He
particularly scorned the idea of an adversary being forced to decide
what evidence to divulge to his opponent:
As this rule goes a long way towards asking a lawyer to prepare
his adversary's case, is to be applied throughout the country
2" /a. at 632.
2" Rule 57(a), Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 161, at CI-804-22.
205 Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary judgments, 22 A.BA. J. 881, 883
(1936).
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and is particularly susceptible to abuse in large cities where
often trial counsel are not known to their adversaries or the
judge, would it not be desirable to experiment first with a rule
requiring such listing only upon order of the Court as is now
provided by the English orders."8
According to Hammond, "{t] he Committee received many protests
against this rule."207 The Sunderland provision was eliminated," 8
thus adding non-adversarial disclosure to the devices that would not
be used to control the system.
There were a few other important changes to discovery rules after
the preliminary draft had been presented to the public, most of them
related to timing. The preliminary draft permitted depositions to be
taken any time after jurisdiction was obtained. 209 The final rule said
that depositions could not be taken until after an answer had been
filed, unless leave of court was obtained. 210 According to Hammond,
this change was "thought to be a protection to defendants against
fishing expeditions," in that a plaintiff cannot file "any claim which
occurs to him," and then go find a real claim through depositions, and
move to amend. As he noted: "The change will also enable the court
to make an order confining the examination to those matters which
relate to the issues as raised by the pleadings, if a motion for such an
order is served under Rule 30(b). "211 Moreover, Hammond reported
that a simplified interrogatory rule, distinguished from the more com-
plicated "depositions upon written interrogatories" rule, would help
defendants who could no longer take depositions before they an-
swered. 212 But the use of the deposition rule was somewhat broadened.
It now included the use of the deposition of an absent witness, and
206 M. (citations omitted). Conboy also thought that the idea of using masters to rule on
evidence was perhaps a good idea. See id.
207 Hammond, supra note 194, at 632. It is important to note that many members of the
Advisory Committee (Clark, Wickersham, Lemann, Dodge, Olney and Mitchell) also expressed
reservations and questions about this rule, including the problems of determining which docu-
ments to list, the penalty for non-production and the huge number of documents the proposed
rule might encompass. See Proceedings of U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules for
Civil Procedure (Nov. 18, 1935), in R.E.coRns OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 159,
at C1-115-76—C1-115-97.
208 See Hammond, supra note 194, at 632.
209 See id. at 631.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 See id. at 632-33. Similarly, Hammond reported that a "request for admissions of the
genuineness of a document cannot now be made until after the pleadings arc closed." Id. at 632.
He also reported that when an admission request is not denied, it will be taken as admitted,
unlike under the preliminary draft that required an express admission. Id.
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"upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used." 213 The require-
ment was now "[r] easonable notice of the taking of an oral deposition,
instead of a prescribed number of days notice, is required to be given
with power in the court, upon motion, to enlarge or shorten the
time."214 The deposition to perpetuate testimony rules gained defini-
tion and no longer permitted resorting to state practice. Hammond
also reported that IQ he rule on physical and mental examination of
a party has been improved, it is hoped, especially in providing for a
compulsory exchange of reports of physicians of opposing parties.” 23
The point is this: except for the demand on the opponent to list
documents and things, every major discovery device previously known
anywhere in the United States, and all of those drafted by Sunderland,
ended up in the final draft, and in many ways, with fewer constraining
devices than he had originally drafted or than were contemplated by
the Advisory Committee during its deliberations.
The Advisory Committee made its Final Report in November
1937.216 The final draft of the proposed rules went smoothly from the
Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court, which made some rela-
tively unimportant changes and promulgated the Federal Rules on
December 20, 1937. 217 The Federal Rules were reported to Congress
by the Attorney General in January 1938 and they took effect, as a
result of congressional inaction, on September 16, 1938. 218
218 flammoncl, supra note 194, at 632.
2141d.
215 a
218 See JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.05 (1st ed. 1947). The
discovery rules in the Final Report were essentially the same as the April draft. From the April
1937 draft through the November 1937 report, until final adoption of the rules, the numbering
of discovery rules and their basic content remained the same. The numbering changed between
the preliminary draft of May 1936 and the April 1937 draft. The Clark Papers, supra note 126,
have an outline, apparently compiled by a Yale librarian, of the numbers of each Federal Rule
in the various drafts. The discovery rules, Federal Rules 26-37, arc outlined on pages 14-16. See
Clark Papers, supra note 126.
217 See MOORE, supra ttote 216, § 0.05. The changes deleted provisions that dealt with eviden-
tiary matters, including a rule that dealt with showing depositions to witnesses for impeachment
purposes.
218 See id.
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VIII. OTHER CONTEMPORANEOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT EXPANDED
DISCOVERY
One justifiably wonders whether the 1930s drafters heard warn-
ings about and anticipated potential costs of an expanded pretrial
discovery system. Of course they did. During their own deliberations
there were misgivings about the potential for using discovery to black-
mail others and to force settlement more related to the costs of discov-
ery than to the merits of the case. Ragland's book repeatedly told
stories of lawyers abusing what little discovery had already existed. 219
Indeed, there were warning signs from the beginning of the Ena-
bling Act movement. In 1922, for instance, Thomas Shelton, who was
largely responsible for keeping the movement alive, wrote an article
entitled Some Plain Talk to Verbose Lawyers, in which he said that it "does
not require a retentive memory to recall that the chief complaint
against the old equity rules was the costly imposition of lengthy depo-
sitions."22° Wallace Lane had written a series of articles in which he
questioned whether the Equity Rules of 1912 were working as well as
advertised. In 1922, he wrote this about the misuses of interrogatories
under the Equity Rules: "Interrogatories seem to be more generally
used for 'fishing expeditions' than definitely to establish facts. 9,221 In
1932, he was particularly critical of references to the use of masters in
equity cases, which "often results in a greater delay to litigants," and
increases the costs. 222
In October 1936, members of the patent bar were invited to
address the Advisory Committee. Based on their experience with the
Equity Rules, the Patent Section Committee of the ABA thought that
for depositions, "it would be better, so far as patent cases are con-
cerned, to shift the burden to the interrogating party . . . .1, 223 Before
219 See, e.g., RAGLAND, supra note 31, at 201. One of the examples was the interrogatory system
in which the questioner could, and sometimes did, ask hundreds of questions, and the answerer
attempted to reveal as little as possible (see supra text accompanying notes 95-98)—the same
tactics that Wayne Brazil so forcibly catalogued fifty years later. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV, 1295, 1323-25
(1978); see also generally Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyer's Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. 13. FOUND. RES. J. 787; Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 217.
229 Thomas W. Shelton, Some Plain Talk to Verbose Lawyers, 94 CENT. L.J. 939, 439 (1922).
221 Wallace R. Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 HARV. L. REV. 276, 295 (1921-1922).
222 Wallace R, Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules, 96 HARV. L. REV. 638, 642-43
(1932-1933).
222 Transcript of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (Oct. 22-24, 1936), in
RECORDS OF TUE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at C1-131-32 (testimony of Merrell
May 19981	 1938 DISCOVERY RULES 	 731
a deposition of an opposing party or its officers or agents were allowed,
the court should "issue an order specifying the scope of the subject
matter to be covered . . . ." 224 This was particularly important to protect
trade secrets and "know-how."2" They thought that prior to interroga-
tories being propounded or depositions being taken, there should be
the same protection. "The purpose of this is to limit at the outset a
`fishing expedition' which might be carried on in a jurisdiction far
away from that in which the action is pending. ""6 They were also
concerned that the new rules would detract from the essential goal of
the Equity Rules to have trials in open court; they did not think their
concerns were "peculiar to the practice of patent law." 227
Also in 1936, in commenting on the Advisory Committee's pre-
liminary draft, Judge Edward Finch of the Court of Appeals of New
York was extremely critical of the proposed discovery provisions on the
grounds that they unduly favored plaintiffs. He warned that they would
"increase so-called speculative litigation or litigation based on suspi-
cion rather than facts, with the hope that such fishing may reveal a
good cause of action as alleged or otherwise . . . "228 Finch argued that
the Federal Rules gave so many tools to those who asserted claims "that
it will be cheaper and more to the self interest [sic] of the defendant
to settle for less than the cost to resist." 229 But it was not only defendants
whom Finch thought might be abused. He argued that if costs are not
reimbursed to the winner:
then a poor litigant is at the mercy of a richer opponent. Thus
a wealthy defendant may force a poor plaintiff with a merito-
rious claim to accept an unfair settlement for the reason that
the further the litigation is carried the greater the expense
which the plaintiff must incur, which continually reduces the
amount of his actual recovery unless he ultimately can obtain
reimbursement for the costs to which he has been subjected
by the unjust defense. 2"
E. Clark). Those testifying for the patent bar were Mr. Howe, Merrell E. Clark and Wallace R.
Lane. See id. at C1-131-26.
224
225 See id.
226 1d. at CI-131-33.
227 See id. at CI-131-41 (testimony of Mr. Lane).
225 Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the Preliminary Draft of
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 22 A.B.A. J. 809, 809 (1936).
229 71, al 810.
236 Id, at 811.
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Finch also argued that "the interests of the clients are adverse to
the interests of some lawyers," speculating that "rflooner or later,
however, clients, laymen generally and taxpayers must revolt at this
misuse and abuse of the right to litigate." 23' The following year Mitchell
tried to blunt the import of Finch's critique: "It may be that in large
metropolitan areas like New York City where the conditions are admit-
tedly bad and many dishonest actions are brought in the courts, the
rules relating to discovery and examination before trial offer opportu-
nities to lawyers of low ethical standards." 292
 In the rest of the country,
though, Mitchell urged that "the rules relating to these subjects are in
line with modern enlightened thought on the subject and will not be
subjected to abuse." 2"
Some of the most trenchant criticism of the proposed new discov-
ery rules came during hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary held during the spring of 1938. 234 The thrust of the critique
was that by superimposing equity rules onto the law side and eliminat-
ing the protections that made equity cases the exception, the new
rules, and particularly the discovery provisions, were making vast in-
trusions on the rights of privacy of individuals and on the right to jury
trial. In addition, critics argued that many of the rules went well beyond
the Enabling Act's limitation that the rules were not to alter, abridge
or modify substantive rights."5
231
232 Mitchell, supra note 83, at 969.
235 1d.
254 See 83 CONG. REC. 4345 (1938) (statements of Sen. King). Recall that the proposed rules
would become law unless Congress passed an act to stop them. Senator King of Utah, in particular,
thought Congress should delay their effective date until elected officials had more opportunity
to study the extent to which the new rules would void conflicting statutes. See id.
235 The following text and notes are examples of this critique. I.H. Marshall, a Washington,
D.C. lawyer, could not understand how Rule 34, which permitted the court to order inspections
of one's house, did not collide with what he had been taught in law school, "that a man's house
was his castle." Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts: Hearings Before a
Subromm. of the Comm. on theJudiciary United Stales Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., on S.J. Res. 281,
A Joint Resolution To Postpone the Effective Date of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, Part 2, 75th Cong 29 (1938) (hereinafter Senate Hearings) (statement of P.
H. Marshall). Moreover, this ability to order inspections was "discretionary with the judge." Even
if a legislature could enact such a rule, he argued, this had been done by the judiciary: "If the
substantive law is not affected by such a rule, then I confess that 1 do not know what the
substantive law is." Id. He then turned to Rule 35 which permitted the court to order a physical
or mental examination of a litigant. He asked: "Can it be possible that my right to privacy is a
mere procedural matter?" Id. He argued that the potential sanctions against lawyers in Rule 37
would chill some lawyers in vigorously representing their client's best interests. "It is a good deal
like saying to a surgeon: 'Go ahead and make your diagnosis, but if it happens to be wrong you
will have to pay the hospital bill.'" Id. at 32. Marshall was quite sure that members of the boards
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Challen B. Ellis, a member of the Washington, D.C. bar, noted that
the new rules went further than equity: "These rules put power in the
hands of the parties which even in equity cases are only in the hands
of the court. "286 He then gave a little lecture on the extraordinary
nature of equity that was now being brought to bear in all cases:
The history of equity procedure shows that it is only to be
used as an extraordinary remedy; that the courts were never
intended to be given power over the person of a plaintiff or
defendant, except where the parties are not dealing at arms
length, or where one has an unfair advantage given by the
law. The court takes charge of the person and conduct of the
parties. No such thing occurs in a lawsuit. No man may be in
jeopardy of his person because somebody sues him for breach
of contract, for which he has a good defense. He does not
submit himself to the court. He submits himself only to the
jury upon evidence in open court. He can take depositions
only when it is shown the witnesses are not available or cannot
be brought within the jurisdiction of the court. That is fun-
damen tal." 7
Kahl K. Spriggs, another Washington, D.C. lawyer, complained
that the discovery provisions went well beyond equity and endangered
both the right to jury trial and the right to have testimony presented
of bar associations who sent their approval for the rules to the House did not "thoroughly"
understand them. See id. at 31.
236 1d. at 42.
237 1d. at 43-44. Ellis later added:
The fundamental difference between law and equity is that law is concerned with
the settlement of an issue of fact by a jury and does not in any manner involve any
restraint on the person of the plaintiff or defendant ... .
Considering the tremendous powers of the chancelor and dangers of abuse,
certain safeguards were thrown around an action in equity which would not be
needed or appropriate in an action at law.
One of the first and most important safeguards is that equity is always an extraor-
dinary remedy; that is, the drastic action of the court against the person of the
parties may not be exercised unless that is the only way the complainant can escape
irreparable injury ...
No one can read rules 26 to 37, inclusive, relating to discovery—appropriate only
in an equity action—without seeing that they will play havoc in an ordinary action
at law for breach of contract or for personal injury.
Id. at 46-47. Ellis did not think it made sense that just because one brought a simple contract or
tort case, and not even under oath, a defendant should be subject to all of the broad discovery
provisions. "The facts thus extorted from the defendant may be "relevant" although inadmissible
as evidence and wholly unnecessary." Id. at 47 (statement of Challen B. Ellis).
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orally in open court. His argument captured the fears of the oppo-
nents:
In general, the various powers of discretion reposed in the
court under the new rules, together with the power of every
litigant to try the case piecemeal, serve to whittle down the
right of trial by jury. Heretofore the theory has been that a
case may be submitted at one time through the medium of
open testimony and in open court, except in the infrequent
instances in which depositions are used. Now, by a kind of
inquisition conducted under rule 26, interrogatories under
rule 33, discovery under rule 34, and admission of facts under
rule 36, together with the consequences imminent under rule
37, there is left little further to be done."'
IX. EARLY JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO THE DISCOVERY REFORM AND
THE 1946 LIBERALIZING AMENDMENTS
Just as the Field Code had met some opposition from both the
bench and the bar seeking to retain aspects of the previous common
law procedure,2" some lawyers and courts fought a rearguard action
against the discovery revolution begun by the Federal Rules."° There
were conflicting decisions on whether the permissible scope for de-
mands for documents, interrogatories and requests for admissions
were the same as or more restrictive than depositions."' Although the
deposition rule's limitation was to "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether
238 83 Cow., REC. 8480-81 (1938).
239 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 939-40.
240 As Rick Marcus explained in another presentation at this conference, it took approxi-
mately three more decades for the counter-revolution to gain force. This counter-revolution
resulted in several amendments that went in the opposite direction, attempting to tighten-up or
deliberalize the process, including wide-open discovery. "Much as discovery had thus become
central to American litigation, it is equally clear that very broad opposition to the liberality of
discovery grew in the early 1970s." See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 747, 752 n.26 (1998); id. §§ II, III (detailing amendment process after 1970).
241 The various discovery devices had different definitions of scope, rather than the general-
ized discovery provisions of Rule 26 with which we are now familiar. See, e.g., L. J. Carey,
Development of Discovery Rule in Casualty Insurance Cases, 7 INS. COUNSEL .). 31, 32 (and citations
therein) (1940); Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 41 MICIL L. REV. 205, 213-18 (interrogatories), 218-21 (production and inspection of
documents), 222-24 (requests for admissions) (1942); Notes, Scope of Pre-Trial Discovery Under
the New Federal Rules, 50 YALE L.J. 708, 708-713 (1941) (and citations therein); Ruth Gottlieb,
Note, 16 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 167, 167-73 (1944) (and citations therein); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
33, 34, 36 advisory committee notes to the 1946 amendments, in 7 McKim, supra note 41, § 33
App.02[2], § 34 App.02121, § 36 App.02[2].
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relating to the claim or defense of . . ." either party, some courts added
"admissibility" as a requirement and, for instance, ruled that one could
not seek evidence that was hearsay. 242 Some courts said that a party
could not seek to discover evidence for purposes of obtaining informa-
tion for use in the cross-examination through the collateral impeach-
ment of a witness who might be called at the tria1.243 There were
disputes about the timing of discovery, 214 whether one could make
requests for admissions that might be labeled "opinion," 245 whether it
mattered that the inquiring party had access to sought facts in a bill of
particulars, 246 whether one could discover with respect to an oppo-
nents' experts217 and the extent to which one could discover facts or
statements that had been acquired by an opponent's lawyer in case
preparation."' (This, of course, was the "work product" issue, decided
in the seminal 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor.) 249
There was a dispute whether the discovery devices could be used
cumulatively. In one case, "[o]ne of the objections on the part of the
defendant was that plaintiff had availed himself of every pre-trial pro-
cedure under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Commenting
on this, the court said: "I regard this not as an objection to this
examination, but rather as an indication of alertness on the part of the
attorney for the plaintiff. "250 One federal judge limited the number of
interrogatories that could be asked as a matter of course, 25 ' and an-
other revived the old limitation about inquiring only to build one's
own case but not to discover facts that supported the case of one's
opponent. 252
242 See, e.g., Poppino v. Jones Store Cu., 1 F.R.D. 215, 217 (W.D. Mo. 1940); Maryland ex. eel.
Montvila v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213, 214-15 (D. Md. 1940); Rose Silk Mills,
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 29 F. Supp. 504, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). For additional citations,
see Fan. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment, in 6 MOORE, supra note 41,
§ 26 App.02[2].
245 See Lynch v. Henry Pollak, Inc., I F.R.D. 120, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); see also Barwick v. Powell,
I ER,D. 604, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
244 See, e.g., Fan. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34 advisory committee note to 1946 amendments, in 6
MOORE, supra note 41, § 26 App.02[2] & 7 Mookt, supra note 41, § 33 App.02[2], § 34
App.02 (2].
246 See Kraus v. General Motors Corp., 29 F. Stipp. 430 (S.D.N.Y 1939); Walsh v. Connecticut
Mut. Lite Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
246 See Bruun v. Hanson, 30 F. Supp. 602, 606 (N.D. Idaho 1939).
217 See Boynton v. Rj. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Stipp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1941); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
212 See Carey, supra note 241, at 32-33.
212 329 U.S. 495, 509-14 (1947).
259 KilliC11 V. Murray et al., 28 F. Supp. 675, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (discussed in Carey, supra
note 241, at 32-33).
251 Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Lab., Inc. 30 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Md. 1939).
252 See Poppino v. Jones Store Cu., 1 F.R.D. 215, 218-19 (W. D. Mo. 1940).
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Following the advice of the Advisory Committee, in 1946 the
Supreme Court promulgated a number of amendments that went a
long way toward completing the discovery revolution. Perhaps most
importantly, all discovery was made subject to an overarching "scope
of discovery" provision in an amended Rule 26, which was then re-
ferred back to in the other discovery rules. The main change was the
addition of the now-familiar sentence: "It is not ground for objection
that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. "255 The committee note to the 1946 amendment was
instructive:
The amendments to subdivision (b) make clear the broad
scope of examination and that it may cover not only evidence
for use at the trial but also inquiry into matters in themselves
inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery
of such evidence. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad
search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters
which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of
his case. . . In such a preliminary inquiry admissibility at
trial should not be the test as to whether the information
sought is within the scope of proper examination. Such a
standard unnecessarily curtails the utility of discovery prac-
tice. Of course, matters entirely without bearing either as
direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within the
scope of inquiry, but to the extent that the examination
develops useful information, it functions successfully as an
instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony
directly admissible . . . . Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Co. (E.D. Wis. 1944) 8 Fed. R. Serv. 34.41, Case 2
( . . the Rules . . . permit 'fishing' for evidence as they
should.") . . . . Thus hearsay, while inadmissible itself, may
suggest testimony which properly may be proved. Under Rule
26(b) several cases, however, have erroneously limited discov-
ery on the basis of admissibility, holding that the word "rele-
vant" in effect meant "material and competent under the
rules of evidence . ." 254
253
 FED. R. Qv. P. 26, 329 U.S. 854 (1946).
251 FED. R. Ctv. P. 26 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment, in 6 MOORE, supra note
41, § 26 App.02[21 (citations omitted).
May 19981	 1938 DISCOVERY RULES 	 737
Other 1946 amendments also broadened discovery or clarified a
previous rule—almost always in a liberalizing direction. 255 For example,
plaintiffs would no longer have to wait for the defendant to answer
before they could depose as a matter of right; one only needed court
permission if a deposition was sought prior to twenty days after com-
mencement of the action. 256 Interrogatories could now be served with-
out leave of court after ten days from commencement of suit, their
scope could be as broad as the amended deposition rule, they could
be served before or after a deposition of the same party, and "[t]he
number of interrogatories or sets of interrogatories to be served is not
limited except as justice requires to protect the party from annoyance,
expense, embarrassment, or oppression."257 Again, the committee
notes emphasized the liberalizing effects of the amendments and re-
buked those courts who had limited their use and effectiveness:
The field of inquiry will be as broad as the scope of examina-
tion under Rule 26(b). There is no reason why interrogato-
ries should be more limited than depositions, particularly
when the former represent an inexpensive means of securing
useful information . . . . Under present Rule 33 some courts
have unnecessarily restricted the breadth of inquiry on vari-
ous grounds . . . Other courts have read into the rule the
requirement that interrogation should be directed only to-
wards "important facts," and have tended to fix a more or less
arbitrary limit as to the number of interrogatories which
could be asked in any case. 258
Rule 34 motions to produce, enter, copy or photograph were
made as broad in scope as the new deposition rule, and the notes made
255 Sonte of the amendments, though, made clear that protective orders could be sought for
types or discovery in addition to depositions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33 advisory committee note
to 1946 amendment, in 7 MOORE., supra note 41, § 33 App.02121 (making Rule 30(b) protective
orders available to one opposing a set of interrogatories); FED. R. Qv. P. 34 advisory committee
note to 1946 amendment, in 7 MoortE, supra note 41, § 34 App.02[2] (doing the same with
respect to motions to produce and inspect),
256 See FED. R. CD/. P. 26(a) 1946 amendment, 329 U.S. 854 (1946). In taking depositions
under Rule 27 before an action has commenced or pending appeal, the rule was clarified to
ensure such depositions could be as broad as other depositions under the rules and specifically
stated that the court had the power to make orders under Rules 34 and 35. See FED. R. Cm P.
27(a)(3) & (b) 1946 amendment, 329 U.S. 854 (1946). The court was given specific permission
to appoint a person to "administer oaths and take testimony" at a deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 28
1946 amendment, 329 U.S. 854 (1946).
257 FED. R. Ctv. P. 33 1946 amendment, 329 U.S. 854 (1946).
25" Fun, R. Cry. P. 33 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment, in 7 MOORE, supra note
41, § 33 App.02[2] (citations omitted).
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clear that the word "designated" in the text of Rule 34 should not be
used to force specification of each particular document. 259 And the
amendment also made clear that an objection to one or more specific
requests could no longer be an excuse for failing to admit or deny the
remaining requests. Even within a specific request, the answerer must
act in "good faith" and "specify so much of it is true and deny only the
re mai n de r. "26°
By the end of the first decade after the Federal Rules became law,
many courts were routinely giving the discovery provisions the full
scope the drafters had intended. Speaking for the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1946 in Hickman, Judge Goodrich made clear that dis-
covery practice had entered a new world. In frequently cited language,
Goodrich wrote an introduction to his discussion of the extent to which
a party could gain information from an opponent and the opponent's
lawyer:
As we approach the question we must discard some favorite
craft notions of the advocate. We must discard, for instance,
the concept that there is something close to a property right
in the information which the lawyer digs up about the client's
case and has in his possession. We must also discard the
notion that questions from the other side can be fended off
on the ground that the opponent's lawyer is simply engaged
in a fishing expedition. These notions are hard to get rid of,
but we take it that they are contrary to the idea of this
discovery portion of the Federal Rules . .
The Rules probably go further than any State practice, but
they are a much greater distance from the practice in some
293 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 34 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment, in 7 MOORE, supra
note 41, § 33 App.02[2] (citations omitted). The Advisory Committee cited a 1908 Supreme
Court case that made clear under a prior rule that if more than "reasonable detail" were required,
then the inquirer "would be compelled to designate each particular paper which it desired, which
presupposes an accurate knowledge of such papers, which the tribunal desiring the papers would
probably rarely, if ever, have." Id. (citing Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541
(1908)). It was not until 1970 that the "good cause" requirement was eliminated, and the rule
was made to "operate extrajudicially." FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee note to 1970
amendment, in 7 MOORE, supra note 41, § 34 App.03 [2] (citations omitted). Some courts, seizing
on ambiguous language in the rule as initially promulgated, had limited Rule 36 requests for
admissions to those "set forth in relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request."
FED. R. Ctv. P. 36 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment, in 7 MOORE, supra note 41, § 36
App.02[2] (citations omitted). The 1946 amendments eliminated the ambiguous language (the
word "therein") and made the scope of permissible requests as broad as what was now permitted
for the scope of depositions and interrogatories. See FED. 12, Civ. P. 36 amendment, 329 U.S. 854
(1946).
269 FED. R. Civ. P. 36 amendment, 329 U.S. 854 (1946).
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States than in others . . . .
We must start any discussion of the use of discovery in a
particular case from the premise that the Rules are intended
to go far in making information known by one party available
to the other. 261
Although on appeal the Supreme Court put limits on discovery
through the imposition of some protection of the lawyer's "work prod-
uct," it, too, emphasized the liberal nature of the federal discovery
rules: "We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-
honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. "262
X. WHAT FACTORS LED TO THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION, DESPITE
THE MANY MISGIVINGS? WHAT CAN FUTURE REFORMERS LEARN
FROM THE EXPERIENCE?
Two big questions remain as we leave the discovery story in 1946.
First, how, in such a relatively short period of time, did the creators of
the federal discovery rules convince the legal world to exchange a "no
fishing" legal universe for one that frequently seemed to require dis-
covery fishing expeditions? Second, what can the current Advisory
Committee and other would-be reformers glean from the experience?
In trying to answer these questions, it is instructive to put discov-
ery reform in the broader context of the procedural jurisprudence of
the time. For centuries, civil procedure had been evolving from tech-
nical to nontechnical, rigid to flexible, constricting to expansive. 253 It
was considered modern to open up and broaden the system, to elimi-
nate lines and categories and to permit the amassing of information.
For Thomas Shelton, procedure should be a simple, uncluttered tun-
nel through which the substantive law should pass largely unscathed. 264
In the phrase that Charles Clark made famous, procedure should be
the handmaiden, not the mistress, of justice:265
This jurisprudence complemented the legal realist movement
(whose primary home was at Clark's Yale Law School) and the New
" 1 Hickman V. Taylor, 153 F.28 212,216-17 (3d Cir. 1945), alp, 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
2" Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
2" See Millar, supra note 28, at 4-9.
264 See Subrin, supra nom 14, at 959.
265
	 Id. at 962; see also generally Charles E. Clark, Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q.
297 (1938).
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Deal whose legislation was contemporaneous with the Federal Rules.'"
Legal realism stressed the importance of amassing all of the facts
before deciding social policy or a case. Clark himself sponsored and
engaged in empirical studies about the tort system and the operation
of the Connecticut courts. 267
 At least from the time of Pound's influen-
tial speech, the theme was to eliminate the "sporting" aspect of trial
work.'" Sunderland's infatuation with virtually unlimited discovery
complemented Clark's embrace of simplified pleading.'" The integral
relationship of all of the rules is an important factor in understanding
the adoption of any portion of them; thus, Rule 16 on pretrial confer-
ences and Rule 56 on summary judgments were logical companions to
the new pleading and discovery rules.
By the time Clark and Sunderland began to draft, the battle for a
merged system had already been won. There would no longer be
equitable procedure and procedure at law as distinct entities.'" As
have written elsewhere, when the same procedure applies to all cases,
equity prevails."' And indeed, it was to equity, which for centuries had
an embryonic discovery system, that the drafters turned.
Enlarging the potential for broad discovery seemed like a good
idea at the time, and probably still is. The idea of hiding relevant facts
and documents from the other side and from the judge and/or jury
makes little sense,"" and there are numerous examples in which broad
discovery has been crucial to arriving at a just result.'"
Nonetheless, there was evidence of discovery abuse and some
deeply held misgivings. Why, then, were anti-discovery arguments ulti-
mately unavailing? Let us first look at the agendas of those most
266
 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 966-69.
267 See, id. at 965.
2118 See supra text accompanying note 120.
2666
	 supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
2711 5re Subrin, supra note 133, at 131-32.
271 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 960-61. When one merges the common law and the equitable
systems so that the same procedure will apply to all cases, it is equity that must win. A restraining
system, with rigid pleading and joinder requirements and a search for reduced issues, will not
work for equity cases. These attempted to do just the opposite—to permit the judge to exercise
discretion in dealing with an entire transaction of multiple parties and issues and with situations
that required flexible legal thinking and remedies.
272 For an explanation of the importance of discovery written during the earlier period of
the Federal Rules, see generally Abraham E. Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of Justice, 22
lItmPLE L.Q. 174 (1948-1949). (Abraham E. Freedman was the name of the plaintiff's lawyer in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946); 1 assume this is the same person, for the article is about
admiralty litigation).
273
 See, e.g., Geoffrey G. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans -substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246-47 (1989).
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connected to the process of legal reform. None of the most important
legal constituencies had much to lose from the broad discovery provi-
sions; in fact they had a good deal to gain. For lawyers the new Federal
Rules generally, and broadened discovery in particular, opened new
horizons. Plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers had the ability to create
new theories and defenses and to engage in extensive discovery, for
which at least some of them would be paid by the hour. 274 The propo-
nents were able to say, as they repeatedly did, that these rules had gone
through multiple drafts and changes and had the support of most of
the organized bar. 275 The conservative ABA276 supported the new rules,
as did the Supreme Court (absent Justice Brandeis) 277 and the
Roosevelt Administration. 278 The rules gave judges enlarged discretion,
and for the most part, they would not be bothered by motions to
initiate discovery. 279 The law professors at many of the most elite
schools, including Clark, Sunderland and Morgan at Harvard and
Dobie at the University of Virginia, who were on the Committee, had
previously committed themselves to liberalizing procedure. 28°
Moreover, the major constituencies were concerned with much
more than the discovery rules. The debate over the Enabling Act had
very little to do with specific procedural rules; its focus was on issues
of national uniformity and on separation of powers. 28 ' During the
274 Of course, a contingent fee lawyer would also gain, for new theories and supporting
discovery meant the potential for increased verdicts and more favorable settlements.
278 See, e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., on SJ. Res. 281,
A Joint Resolution to Postpone the Effective Date of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, 75th Cong. 3-4, 20 (1958) (statements of William D. Mitchell and Edgar B.
Tolman).
276 On the conservative nature of the ABA during this period, see generally JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
277 For one explanation of Justice Brandeis' opposition, see Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 177, 191 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 2d ed. 1964).
278 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., on H.R. 8892 with regard to the
"Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States" Adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States Pursuant to the Act ()Hung 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064), 75th Cong. 3-4 (1938)
(statement of Hon. Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter House
Hearings].
279 The exceptions were Federal Rules 34 and 35.
288 See, e.g., Letter from E.M, Morgan to Clark (Feb. 28, 1935), in Clark Papers, supra note
126, at Box 108, Folder 41; see also ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK or FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE 589-90 (1928); supra text accompanying notes 148-58. Professors McCaskill of
Illinois and Charles A. Keigwin of Georgetown, who caged doubts on the project, were not part
of the "elite" nor considered "modern." For McCaskill's views, see Subrin, supra note 14, at
992-94; for Kcigwin's views, see Senate Hearings, supra note 235, at 33-39.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 7-21.
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drafting process, the Supreme Court was confronted with controversial
New Deal legislation, as well as with FDR's attack on the Court. 282
Congress, too, was dealing with the Depression and its aftermath, and
during the debate in Congress, as Mitchell had actually predicted,
matters other than discovery held center stage. 283
 Injunctions, particu-
larly in labor cases, the right to a jury trial, and what entities could sue
or be sued, which was a vital topic for labor organizations and corpo-
rations, dominated the debates. 284
Another important ingredient was the brilliance of the advocacy
before Congress. Edgar B. Tolman, Secretary of the Advisory Commit-
tee and Editor of the A.B.A. Journal, breezed through the discovery
rules and when asked a few questions about them, gave brief, cogent
answers. 285
 Mitchell acted with the political astuteness one would ex-
pect from a former Solicitor General and Attorney General. The ad-
vocacy was superb, if a little misleading. 288 The discovery rules were
repeatedly touted as either merely repeating the Equity Rules 287 (while,
as we have seen, they went well beyond them) or based on the well-ac-
cepted rules in a number of states. The new discovery rules were both
dependent on the past and liberal, modern and simple. The commit-
tee notes merely listed for each rule a series of statutes or equity rules
that covered the same subject, without analyzing how each rule either
chose the most liberal path or went beyond it. The competing policies
were not discussed in the committee notes nor did the Advisory Com-
2" For the period February 5 through July 22, 1937, an Encyclopedia of American History states
the following: "The continued invalidation by the Supreme Court of major New Deal economic
and social legislation led to the severest test of President Roosevelt's political leadership. On 5
Feb. Roosevelt submitted to Congress a plan for reorganizing the federal judiciary .... An-
nouncement of the plan aroused widespread and bitter debate ...." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
HISTORY BICENTENNIAL EDITION 420 (Richard B. Morris, ed., 1976).
263
 Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure of
the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 25, 1936), in RECORDS or THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at CI-213-84. Mitchell stated: "There arc just two subjects in these
rules, although I may be wrong about it, that Congress would be inquisitive about. One is the
preservation of jury trial inviolate and the other is the injunction." Id.; see also id. at CI-210-58—
CI-210-59. Donworth, commenting on summary judgment: "I think this is one of the most serious
rules in our whole group, and it will be the one subject to the most criticism unless you throw
every safeguard around the man who wants his case tried by jury." Id. at CI-210-58. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 278, at 17 (commenting on evidence), 51 (commenting on Norris-LaGuardia
Act), 52-53 (commenting on service on unions).
284 See House Hearings, supra note 278, at 13, 18-24, 40-46 (capacity to sue and be sued);
16-17 (jury trials); 49-50 (injunctions).
285 See id. at 113-17, 132.
286 See id. at 9-15 (Clark); 15-26 (Mitchell).
2" Tolman stated: "These rules, therefore, contain everything that there was in the old equity
rules about discovery and make them applicable to the united rules." Id. at 140-41.
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mittee share its own concerns in the notes or with Congress. Their
arguments were repeated so often and so forcefully that they became
the new orthodoxy. 288 This made it easy to characterize opponents as
old-fashioned. 2"
The drafters were faced with the problem of how to control the
new, expanded discovery devices. As we have seen, none of the solu-
tions seemed attractive to them. 'Using definitions, like an admissibility
test, would cause constant disputes. Having judges decide in advance
whether to permit each type of discovery and to define its scope on a
case-by-case basis seemed expensive and an unwise use of judicial time.
So, too, did having judges preside over each deposition. The use of
masters to preside over the discovery was also expensive and gave more
power to masters than committee members and others thought desir-
able. Arbitrary limits on discovery, understandably, seemed arbitrary.
Mandatory disclosure appeared ,to some to fly in the face of an adver-
sary system. 29° The solution the drafters adopted—a judicial protective
order or a termination or curtailment if needed in a particular case—
was attractive. It permitted the "fishing," but also permitted the court
to control excesses at the behest of an aggrieved party. The proponents
of broad discovery, and the skeptics on the Committee who ultimately
acquiesced in the rules, probably thought that their provisions for
protective orders and motions to terminate or limit discovery did in
fact give necessary protections.
It can be misleading to look at a reform in hindsight. Although
the drafters did have large cases in mind,29 ' I think it is fair to say that
the drafters as a group would be amazed at how immense many cases
now become and how prominent a role discovery plays in that process.
Some things they could not have known: the advent of copying ma-
288 Even Senator King, who wanted to postpone the effective date of the rules to allow more
time to study, accepted that the discovery rules were those already existent in the Equity Rules
even though they went beyond those rules in virtually every respect: scope of discovery, who could
be deposed, lack of requirement for permission to depose, scope of requests for admission and
types of discovery permitted. He admitted that one could find examples somewhere of rules
covering depositions, interrogatories, notices to admit, demands to inspect and copy and physical
and mental examinations. But what the drafters did, he implied, was take all of the most liberal
rules and eliminate most of their safeguards and limitations. 83 Cristo. REC. 8473,8478 (1938).
289 For years leading up to the drafting of the rules, and during the deliberation on the rules,
potential opponents were depicted as old-fashioned or pursuing their own selfish interests. See,
e.g., House Hearings, supra note 278, at 2 (Homer Cummings); see also Subrin, supra note 14, at
968-69 (discussing Clark).
290 See supra text accompanying note 206.
291 The transcripts of their deliberations repeatedly recount discussions about rate-setting
cases, equity litigation generally, admiralty and patent cases and potential strike suits against
corporations and their officers. See Subrin, supra note 14, at 972-73. "When one member [Olney]
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chines and computers; the huge size of law firms and litigation depart-
ments; the many factors leading to the large overhead of major firms;
and the enormous growth and change in substantive law. I think the
drafters also would have been surprised at the role of civil claims as,
to use Professor Hazard's words, "an integral part of law enforcement
in this country . . . . [Tlhe scope of discovery determines the scope of
effective law enforcement in many fields regulated by law." 292
There was also an important conceptual flaw in the overall proce-
dural outlook of the proponents of expanded discovery that made it
easier for them to adopt a wide-open discovery regime without fully
comprehending its consequences. Ragland and Sunderland treated
facts as if they were a static, knowable item to be found; discovery was
compared to an x-ray that reveals the inner nature of the body. 293
Because of their past experience with limited discovery, the drafters
focused on failures to disclose. Consequently, their sanction provisions
were for failures to permit discovery, rather than for abuses of over-dis-
covery.
Almost sixty years later, we tend to think of discovery as both
expandable and contractible. Many of the critical mixed questions of
law and fact in current substantive law are pliable and open-ended. It
is not self-evident how many years backwards one should look or what
witnesses and documents should be included in justifiable discovery
on the issues of discriminatory intent or defective products. Indeed,
contemporary scientific and literary notions invite one even to be
suspicious that there are objective ts." 299
We have begun to adapt to the notion of. "proportionality" in
discovery. A line of inquiry may be "relevant" or may "lead to admissi-
ble evidence," and yet the costs of discovery may substantially outweigh
the stakes involved. Since 1983, the Federal Rules have mandated that
observed that they were drafting a code primarily for 'actions tried by the court,' rather than a
jury, no one disagreed." Id. at 973 (citation omitted). Clark knew that the business of the federal
courts, particularly in cases involving the government, was different from the normal case based
on diversity of citizenship. See Subrin, supra note 133, at 148. Their rules borrowed heavily from
equity and equity cases were notoriously large in theories, parties, documents, costs and lengths
of Lime. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. Rev. 27, 36 (1994).
292 Report of the Conference on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Mar. 30-31, 1995)
(co-sponsored by the Southwestern Legal Foundation and the Southern Methodist University
School of Law (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter)).
293 See supra text accompanying note 158.
294 See, e.g., Judith Glans l3rown, et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women
in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L. REV. 457, 467-77 (1996) (discussing myths in
the guise of "facts" in the context of Brandeis's brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
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the amount of discovery be related to "the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, [and] the importance of
the issues at stake . . ."295 On December 1, 1993, a new proportionality
rule was added. The court may now consider "the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues." "'e The Advisory Committee
notes to the 1993 discovery amendments offered yet a third propor-
tionality issue: the parties should craft their automatic disclosure to the
degree of fact-particularity in the opponent's pleading. 297 In short, the
entire enterprise of finding and discovering "facts" probably looks a
good deal more complex and uncertain to us than it did to our
procedural predecessors.
What are the lessons we should take from the saga of the discovery
rules? Reformers are prone to put aside evidence and arguments that
do not meet the ideal of their reform. Lawyers arc good at finding
arguments to support their point of view. Empirical data can be over-
simplified and misused. Ragland painted a more complex picture than
his conclusions supported or than those who cited him shared with
others. Procedure that is defining, rigorous and complex is problem-
atic; but simple, flexible and expansive procedures have problems of
their own. Civil procedure is a field in which the component parts are
interrelated: pleading, joinder, discovery, summary judgment and pre-
trial conference are best viewed integrally.
We live in a procedural world that is more complicated than it
appeared to Clark, Sunderland, Mitchell and their colleagues. There
is a real problem: how to permit discovery "fishing" sufficient to reach
just results without expeditions in which the costs of time, money and
privacy outweigh the gains. Our procedural ancestors discussed discov-
ery problems, but rejected most of the solutions. This may now be a
luxury we cannot afford.
29
 FED. It Civ. P. 26(h) (2) (iii). Advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments to this
rule specifically state that Rule 26(h) (2) (iii) "addressles] the problem of discovery that is dispro-
portionate to the individual lawsuit as measured by such matters as its nature and complexity, the
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MOORE, supra note 41, § 26 App.07[2].
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297 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes, in 6 Moon.% supra note 41, § 26
App.09[2]. "The greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more
complete should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of documentary evidence." Id.
